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What is the relationship between real exchange rate misalignments and economic growth?
And what e⁄ect, if any, did undervaluations or overvaluations of the lira/euro have on Italy￿ s
growth? We address these questions by presenting, ￿rst, three main facts: (i) there is a positive
relationship between undervaluation and growth; (ii) this relationship is strong for developing
countries and weak for advanced countries; (iii) these results tend to hold for both the pre- and
the post-World War II period. Building a simple analytical model, we explore channels through
which undervaluation may exert a positive e⁄ect on real GDP. We assume that productivity is
higher in the tradeable-goods than in the non-tradeable-goods sector, and examine the roles of
market structure, scale economies and wage ￿ exibility in channelling resources from the latter to
the former sector, increasing exports and real GDP. We then turn to Italy and verify empirically
that, as the theory suggests, undervaluation has positively a⁄ected its exports. Undervaluation
has been helpful, in particular, to increase the exports of high-productivity sectors, such as most
manufacturing industries. Finally, we describe the misalignments of the lira/euro since 1861,
analyze their determinants and draw the implications for Italy￿ s economic growth.
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Italy￿ s interactions with Europe and the world and the role of the external sector in its growth
and development are, like those of any other country, complex and multifaceted.1 In this paper
we focus on one speci￿c facet: the real exchange rate, or the price of goods and services in Italy
relative to other countries. We utilize the real exchange rate as a window onto the policies and
circumstances shaping the impact of external conditions on domestic economic development.
Why focus on the real exchange rate, one of many di⁄erent prices a⁄ecting the allocation
of resources and the growth of the economy? For one thing, a substantial literature connects
the real exchange rate to economic development and growth. Balassa (1964) is an early and
in￿ uential statement of the importance of a competitively valued real exchange rate in supporting
exports and, in turn, of their role for economic growth. More recently, similar arguments have
been made by, inter alia, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003), Easterly (2005),
Galindo, Izquierdo and Montero (2006), Bhalla (2007), Johnson, Ostry and Subrimanian (2007),
Eichengreen (2008a) and Rodrik (2008). These recent studies also o⁄er empirical evidence,
generally from cross-country regressions on post-1980 data, suggesting a connection running
from the real exchange rate to economic growth ￿ evidence that tends to be most robust for
developing countries.
What are the determinants of the real exchange rate? Since Balassa (1964) and Samuel-
son (1964), it has been widely observed that the real exchange rate varies with economic de-
velopment. While there is a tendency for the price of tradeable goods to be equalized across
countries, the relative price of non-tradeable goods will tend to be lower in developing countries.
In more advanced countries, where labor productivity and wages are higher, the relative price of
non-tradeable goods will similarly tend to be higher. The International Comparison Program,
producer of the Penn World Table, of which we make use in this paper, is predicated on these
insights (see Kravis, 1986).
At the same time, the mapping from per capita income to the real exchange rate is not
mechanical. In open economies like Italy, when the domestic demand for tradeable and non-
tradeable goods rises, the price of tradeable goods will still be tied down by the law of one price,
at least to a ￿rst approximation. But the price of non-tradeable goods will be driven up by
the additional demand and the real exchange rate will appreciate. Relative to the benchmark
where domestic aggregate demand equals supply (trade is balanced), it will become "overvalued."
Similarly, wage stickiness and other frictions, that prevent relative prices from adjusting following
a change in the nominal exchange rate, produce temporary undervaluation or overvaluation of
the real exchange rate.
As the textbooks tell us (viz Dornbusch 1980), a variety of policies a⁄ecting the balance
of aggregate supply and demand will tend to in￿ uence the real exchange rate. An expansionary
1The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect those of the
Bank of Italy. We thank Mary Amiti, Jonathan Eaton, Philippe Martin, Fabrizio Onida, Paolo Pesenti,
Gianni Toniolo and seminar participants at the Brixen Workshop 2011, SADiBa (Perugia Conference)
and the New York Fed for many useful comments. We are also grateful to Alberto Ba¢ gi, Claudia
Borghese, Claire Giordano, Dennis Quinn, Sandra Natoli, Angelo Pace and Alan Taylor for their help
in the construction of the data set. E-mail: virginia.dinino@bancaditalia.it, eichengr@econ.berkeley.edu,
massimo.sbracia@bancaditalia.it
1￿scal policy that stimulates domestic spending will produce real appreciation and be associated
with problems of overvaluation. Capital controls will limit the contribution of capital in￿ ows to
demand, avoiding those problems of overvaluation. Intervention in the foreign exchange market
will prevent a sharp shift in the nominal exchange rate, whatever its source, from producing
a sudden and uncomfortable change in the real exchange rate. As we write this, a surge of
capital in￿ ows creating pressure for real appreciation and raising concerns about overvaluation
is causing emerging-market economies to respond with all three policies ￿ intervening in the
foreign exchange market, imposing controls, and tightening ￿scal policy ￿ conscious as they are
of the advantages of a competitively valued exchange rate.
This is a distinctly modern perspective, however. How should we think about real exchange
rate determination in the XIX century, before the advent of discretionary ￿scal policy, capital
controls, and sterilized intervention? Decisions of what monetary regime to adopt and at what
level to set the domestic price of gold or silver can still a⁄ect the real exchange rate if competition
in goods or labor markets is imperfect and relative prices are slow to adjust. Capital in￿ ows and
out￿ ows, which raise and lower demand, will still a⁄ect the real exchange rate (as the literature
reminds us: see Fenoaltea, 1988). Labor market distortions that slow the reallocation of labor
from the low-productivity sheltered sector to the high-productivity export sector, of the sort
described by Lewis (1954), will tend to depress the relative price of home goods, resulting in a
persistently undervalued exchange rate. And by a⁄ecting the real exchange rate, these factors
a⁄ect the development of the export sector and the growth of the economy. As we will show,
there is evidence of the operation in Italy of all these mechanisms in the era since uni￿cation.
Some of them, we will suggest, are pivotal for understanding the contours of the country￿ s
economic development in the post-uni￿cation period.
We start by revisiting and broadening the evidence provided by Rodrik (2008) on the rela-
tionship between economic growth and undervaluation, where the latter is measured by the real
exchange rate, corrected for the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect. We extend Rodrik￿ s analysis in three
directions. First, we use a more recent release of the Penn World Table, which includes sharp re-
visions for those countries, like China, that experienced very high rates of growth and very high
degrees of undervaluation. Second, we consider a variety of di⁄erent measures of undervaluation.
Third, and most important, we expand the time span (Rodrik covers only the post-World War
II years), going back to as far as 1861. This analysis points to three main conclusions. The ￿rst
two support Rodrik￿ s main ￿ndings: there is a positive relationship between undervaluation and
economic growth; and while this relationship is strong, and both statistically and economically
signi￿cant for developing countries, it is weak for advanced countries. In addition, we ￿nd that
these results hold regardless of the time period: in particular, they tend to hold for the pre- and
the post-World War II period.
We then examine, by developing a simple analytical model, channels through which un-
dervaluation may exert a positive e⁄ect on growth. Our key assumption is that productivity
is higher in the tradeable-goods sector than the non-tradeable-goods sector ￿ consistent with
Lewis￿tenet about the productivity di⁄erential between the modern and traditional sectors.
We investigate the roles of market structure, scale economies and wage ￿ exibility in channeling
resources to the high-productivity tradeable-goods sector and raising GDP.
In the models of trade that we consider, we replicate the e⁄ects of a nominal depreciation
of the currency with an increase in the barriers to imports and a symmetric decline in the barriers
2to exports. This captures the essence of what a real depreciation does: it makes exports cheaper
and imports more expensive.2 We are comforted about the soundness of this assumption by
the results from the baseline model. By extending the Eaton-Kortum model of trade (Eaton
and Kortum, 2002) to encompass the non-tradeable-goods sector, we show that with perfect
competition, constant returns to scale, and perfectly ￿ exible wages, a depreciation does not
have any e⁄ect on equilibrium quantities and relative prices ￿ as is to be expected in this type
of model. The decline in marginal costs due to the depreciation, in fact, is completely o⁄set by
a rise, of the same extent as the depreciation, in nominal wages. This model, in fact, assumes
that wages and product prices are perfectly ￿ exible, so that, right after the depreciation, the
economy jumps to a new equilibrium with higher wages and product prices. In other words, a
nominal depreciation does not produce a real depreciation. The real exchange rate cannot be
undervalued nor overvalued: following the nominal depreciation, the rise in wages and product
prices immediately restores pre-depreciation equilibrium quantities and relative prices.
The model also shows that if wages and product prices adjust slowly, then, during the
transition to a new equilibrium, the currency remains undervalued and some gains in marginal
costs obtain. With sticky wages and standard assumptions about the elasticity of substitution
between tradeable and non-tradeable goods, an undervalued currency channels resources to the
tradeable sector. Thus, even with perfect competition and constant returns to scale, undervalu-
ation has real e⁄ects in the short-medium run. Clearly, their duration depends on the strength
of the frictions that prevent wages and prices from rising (such as, persistence of "unlimited
supply of labor" to the tradeable sector, extent of unemployment, frequency of foreign exchange
rate interventions, presence of capital controls, etc.). As the adjustment takes place, however,
gains in marginal costs are reversed and the depreciation has no real e⁄ects in the long run.
A nominal depreciation may exert persistent real e⁄ects, also if we replace the assumptions
of perfect competition and constant returns to scale with Bertrand competition and increasing
returns.3 With increasing returns to scale, ￿rms may have an incentive to sell their goods abroad
even if they make negative pro￿ts on foreign markets. These ￿rms may decide to export in order
to produce at larger scale, cut their average costs, and make large enough pro￿ts in the domestic
market ￿ a possibility precluded in models with constant returns to scale, because there is no
cost advantage from producing at a higher scale.4 A depreciation by ￿%, in fact, cuts ￿rms￿
2For instance, in discussing the current relationship between the U.S. and China, Krugman (2010a) asserts
that: "China is following a policy that is, in e⁄ect, one of imposing high tari⁄s and providing large export subsidies
￿ because that￿ s what an undervalued currency does" (emphasis added); and, similarly: "China is deliberately
keeping its currency arti￿cially weak. The consequences of this policy are also stark and simple: in e⁄ect, China
is taxing imports while subsidizing exports" (Krugman 2010b, emphasis added).
3We are not the ￿rst to unveil persistent real e⁄ects of changes in the nominal exchange rate in the presence
of increasing returns to scale. Baldwin (1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989), for instance, prove that these
e⁄ects arise in the presence of sunk costs. Similarly, Krugman (1987) shows these e⁄ects in the presence of
dynamic external economies of scale. (More recently, Melitz (2005) shows that tari⁄s and quotas yield welfare
enhancing e⁄ects in the presence of dynamic external economies of scale.) Our results, however, are more general
than those in the previous literature, because they draw on the presence of increasing returns to scale only, and
do not require that costs are sunk nor that external economies of scale are dynamic.
4We remove the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale simultaneously for two main
reasons. First, the model with perfect competition and increasing returns to scale, analyzed by Ethier (1982),
yields several "pathologies," such as multiple equilibria, that hamper the possibility of making comparative statics.
Second, the model with Bertrand competition and constant returns to scale, developed by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen
3average costs by more than ￿%, thanks to the additional cost gains coming from the economies
of scale. Hence, a rise in relative wages by ￿% is not su¢ cient to o⁄set the gain in average costs.5
While the economy converges to a new equilibrium with higher (relative) wages following the
depreciation, some domestic ￿rms gain a competitive advantage. Thus, some domestic ￿rms
￿nd access to the foreign market, while some goods are no longer imported and are domestically
produced. Given standard elasticities, this translates into a shift of resources to the high-
productivity tradeable-goods sector and, then, into a rise in real GDP. These gains obtain with
the real exchange rate set at its equilibrium level and are even larger during the transition to the
new equilibrium, when the currency is undervalued (owing to the same mechanisms described
above).
Our analysis also explains why a growth strategy based on currency undervaluation or
serial nominal depreciations in the presence of increasing returns to scale cannot be pursed ad
in￿nitum. With perfect competition and constant returns to scale, wages and prices eventually
adjust, o⁄setting the depreciation. With Bertrand competition and increasing returns to scale,
the competitive gains decline with industry output and, then, become increasingly smaller as
the economy develops. Finally, the maintained assumption of a positive productivity di⁄erential
between the tradeable-goods and non-tradeable goods sectors ￿ which is reasonable if these
sectors broadly correspond to what Lewis (1954) dubbed as modern and traditional sectors, as
it happens in many low-income countries ￿ may not be appropriate in advanced economies
where non-tradeable products include, for instance, high-productivity ￿nancial services.
We then turn to Italy and verify whether, as the theory suggests, undervaluation supported
growth by increasing exports. We consider di⁄erent features of Italy￿ s exports: their growth rate,
their nominal and real value, and their extensive margin (number of distinct goods sold abroad).
The results show that undervaluation has positively a⁄ected all these features. Yet, these positive
e⁄ects do not take place homogeneously across industries. Plausibly, undervaluation does not
raise exports of primary products. It is, instead, especially helpful to increase the exports of high-
productivity sectors such as machinery and transport equipment, as well as other manufactures.
Finally, we focus on the undervaluation of the lira/euro and, in light of the previous
results, we assess its connection with Italy￿ s growth and trade. Figure 1 shows two measures of
undervaluation for Italy in the period 1861-2011: one is bilateral, calculated with respect to the
US dollar (for which we also provide a 5% con￿dence band); the other is computed against a
trade-weighted basket of currencies (see Section 5 for details). Evidently, Italy bene￿ted from
a strongly undervalued currency during the key catching-up phase of 1950-1973. During this
crucial period, Italy recorded a very strong economic growth. Its real GDP per capita tripled,
almost closing the income gap with respect to the major European countries. The currency was
and Kortum (2003), would yield essentially the same results as the model with perfect competition. Thus,
assuming increasing returns to scale is key in order to have real e⁄ects of changes in the exchange rate also in the
presence of ￿ exible wages, while Bertrand competition is needed to show these e⁄ects with a tractable model.
5Although relative wages could rise by more than ￿%, there is no rise in relative wages that can restore the
pre-depreciation equilibrium. Because the degree of increasing returns to scale is heterogeneous across industries,
the decline in average costs connected to the rise in output is also di⁄erent across industries. Even if increasing
returns to scale were the same across industries, however, the latter are heterogeneous in productivities and, then,
starting from heterogeneous output levels, the decline in average costs would be di⁄erent across industries. Thus,
pre-depreciation equilibrium quantities and relative prices cannot be restored across all industries.















































































bilateral undervaluation (vs. the US)
5% confidence interval
trade-weighted index
Source: authors￿ calculations. (1) Data in logs. A positive (negative) value corresponds to undervaluation
(overvaluation). The two shaded areas correspond to the periods 1914-1920 and 1939-1950.
broadly at equilibrium in 1895-1913 and again undervalued in the 1970s and 1980s (based on
the trade-weighted index). In both these periods, Italy￿ s growth was sustained, and somewhat
better than that of the main European countries. From the early 1990s, a period of very
slow growth, the currency was overvalued and the exchange rate provided a negative, albeit
small, contribution to growth. On the other hand, Italy￿ s currency was undervalued in 1861-
1895 and during the interwar period, when growth rates were, in contrast to the predictions of
the theory, very low. Economic, ￿nancial and political instability in the ￿rst 30 years of the
new reign and the Great Depression in the interwar period prevented the country from taking
advantage of its undervalued currency. In general, these results seem to con￿rm the hypothesis
that an undervalued currency is a facilitating condition, but not an engine, of economic growth
(Eichengreen, 2008a).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the main stylized facts
about undervaluation and growth. Section 3 presents a theoretical model which illustrates
how undervaluation may a⁄ect growth by boosting exports and reallocating labor toward the
tradeable sector. We then turn to Italy and, in Section 4 we examine the e⁄ect of undervaluation
on Italy￿ s exports. In Section 5, we compute and describe a measure of undervaluation of the
lira/euro in the period 1861-2011, analyze its determinants, and then draw the implications for
Italy￿ s economic growth.
5Part I
Exchange rates, trade and economic growth
2 Exchange rates and growth: cross-country evidence
We start by revisiting the evidence provided by Rodrik (2008), for the period following World
War II, that undervaluation is positively related to the growth of real GDP per capita. We then
ask whether the same relationship also holds in earlier years.
The key variable needed to compute the real exchange rate and, in turn, undervaluation is
the purchasing power parity (PPP) rate, that is the value of the exchange rate that would yield
the same price level as in the reference country, in general the United States, when expressed in
a common currency (usually US dollars). The real exchange rate is de￿ned as the ratio between
the market and the PPP exchange rate, usually measured in term of units of domestic currency
per one US dollar, so that an increase means depreciation. A real exchange rate above one
means that goods and services are cheaper in a country than in the United States.
This measure, by itself, does not capture a misalignment of the exchange rate. As it has
been well known since Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964), non-tradeable goods are cheaper
in developing than in advanced countries, re￿ ecting the higher productivity and, then, the
higher input costs in the latter. Therefore, measures of misalignment are built by correcting for
this Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect. The correction involves regressing the real exchange rate on a
variable related to the degree of development of each country (typically, real GDP per capita);
undervaluation is then de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the observed and the predicted real
exchange rate. In this way, undervaluation captures the price di⁄erential between the United
States and the country in excess of what can be predicted by considering the country￿ s level of
development.6
Following Rodrik (2008), undervaluation can be obtained by running the regression:
rerPWT
n;t = a + by
pc
n;t + ct + "n;t , (1)
where rerPWT
n;t , the log of real exchange rate from the Penn World Table (PWT) of country n






with xratn;t and PPPn;t denoting, respectively, the nominal and the PPP exchange rate vis-￿-
vis the US dollar; y
pc
n;t is the log of real GDP per capita; ct is a set of time dummies; "n;t the
6There are other possible methodologies to measure the equilibrium level of the real exchange rate. For instance,
following Nurske (1945), the equilibrium real exchange rate can be de￿ned as the relative price of tradable to
domestic non-tradable goods that achieves internal (full employment) and external equilibrium (trade balance).
Misalignment is then computed as the residual from a regression of the real exchange rate on a set of variables
that a⁄ect prices over the long run. These variables usually include not only real GDP per capita, but also, among
the others, trade openness, government consumption, and terms of trade (see, in particular, Lee, Milesi-Ferretti,
Ostry, Prati and Ricci, 2008, for a recent survey of the methodologies utilized by International Monetary Fund).
Berg and Miao (2010) show that this di⁄erent methodology to measure undervaluation yields very similar results
(see for instance, Figure 2 in Berg and Miao, 2010). Not surprisingly, Berg and Miao (2010) and MacDonald and
Vieira (2010) con￿rm that estimates of the relationship between undervaluation and growth are robust to the
method chosen to measure the former.
6residual; and a;b 2 R. Undervaluation is then de￿ned as:
uPWT
n;t = ^ "n;t = rerPWT
n;t ￿ c rer
PWT
n;t .
In the second step, one can examine whether undervaluation a⁄ects growth by estimating:
gn;t = ￿n + ￿y
pc
n;t￿1 + ￿uPWT
n;t + dt + ￿n;t , (2)
where gn;t is the growth rate of real GDP per capita, y
pc
n;t￿1 controls for the initial conditions
and dt for time speci￿c unobserved e⁄ects, ￿n are ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿n;t is the residual, and ￿;￿ 2 R.
Because it takes time for misalignments to exert their e⁄ect on growth, Rodrik uses ￿ve-year
averages of all the variables. Therefore, each time t denotes non-overlapping ￿ve-year periods.
In this paper we follow the same methodology as Rodrik (2008), extending the analysis
in three main directions. First, we use a more recent release of the PWT: the version 6.3,
from Heston, Summers and Aten (2009), that covers the period 1950-2007, which we extend
to 2009 using the May release of PWT version 7.0;7 we also use some alternative data sources
for prices, exchange rates and real GDP per capita. This is more than a just technical point,
because the PWT undergoes frequent and often extensive revisions of PPP-adjusted rates (see
Johnson, Larson, Papageorgiou and Subramanian, 2009, for a critique). Many authors, for
instance, recommended using other versions of the PWT as a robustness test (see the section
General Discussion of Rodrik￿ s paper). The two most recent releases, in particular, entail strong
revisions for those very countries, like China, experiencing the highest rates of growth and
degrees of undervaluation (partly leading the result that undervaluation is positively related to
growth). For example, in the period 1950-2004 (the one common to Rodrik￿ s as well as our
data set), the new data suggests that China￿ s average rate of growth of real GDP per capita
is 4:6%, as opposed to 5:5% in the previous release (version 6.2). The initial 1950 level of the
same variable is 70% larger in the newer than in the older release.8
Second, we consider both corrected and "weakly" corrected measures of undervaluation.









where WPIn;t is the wholesale price index (or producer price index) of country n at time t,
CPIn;t is the consumer price index of country n at time t, and the subscript us denotes the
United States. Following Woodford (2008), we can plug (alternatively) rerWPI
n;t and rerCPI
n;t into
7The version 7.0 of the Penn World Table has undergone very frequent revisions: a ￿rst version was released
in March 2011, another one in April and a third one in May, when we were revising our estimates. This version,
however, still had several problems, so we kept using the version 6.3 and exploited the version 7.0 only to extend
the data set to 2009 (using changes of the main variables). A fourth version of the data set has been released in
June 2011, too late to be considered for this paper.
8The revision for China is so strong that the two latest releases of the Penn World Table make available two
di⁄erent country series: one (China Version 1) is similar to the series contained in the version 6.2 of the table;
the other (China Version 2), which is recommended by the Penn World Table producers and the one used in our
empirical analysis, incorporates stronger revisions.
7the empirical model (2) in the place of uPWT
n;t . Even though rerWPI
n;t and rerCPI
n;t measure only
the real exchange rate, and not the degree of misalignment, according to Woodford (2008) both
these measure do entail a form of correction (although "weak"), once they are plugged into
the growth regression (2). The reason is that this model includes country ￿xed e⁄ects that, in
turn, can account for the di⁄erent growth rates due to factors such as the Balassa-Samuelson
e⁄ect. This form of correction is "weak," because it neglects changes in the country￿ s level
of development during the sample period. Thus, it is more precise for shorter time periods
(in which changes in a country level of development are small) or for countries in which real
GDP per capita is more stable. Note, also, that both these rates can be corrected to obtain
measures of undervaluation, denoted with uWPI
n;t and uCPI
n;t , as residuals of the estimates of (1),
where rerPWT
n;t is replaced with, respectively, rerWPI
n;t and rerCPI
n;t . To sum up, in our empirical




n;t , and the "weakly corrected" measures rerWPI
n;t and rerCPI
n;t .9
Our third and most important extension concerns the time span of the sample, which
we bring back to as far as 1861, the time of Italy￿ s uni￿cation. We gather data on exchange
rates vis-￿-vis the US dollar, wholesale price indices and consumer price indices (from several
sources), as well as real GDP per capita (from Maddison, 2010), for 34 countries from 1861 to
1939 (details are in Appendix A). We then merge these data with the PWT to obtain a data
set spanning almost 150 years.
Equation (1) is estimated, as in Rodrik, using OLS when the dependent variable is rerPWT
n;t .
The estimated coe¢ cient for yn;t is equal to ￿0:26 and it is strongly signi￿cant (Rodrik ￿nds
a similar coe¢ cient of ￿0:24).10 The negative sign means that, as expected, higher income per
capita reduces the degree of undervaluation for a given real exchange rate. When the dependent
variable is rerWPI
n;t or, alternatively, rerCPI
n;t , we estimate a panel model with random e⁄ects (see
footnote 8) and the corresponding coe¢ cients are ￿0:16 and ￿0:29, respectively, with only the
latter strongly signi￿cant.
Equation (2) is estimated using a variety of methods (linear panel with ￿xed e⁄ects and
GMM), for di⁄erent samples of countries and time periods. Table 1 reports the results of the
estimates for the whole time span (i.e. from 1861 to 2009), di⁄erent sets of countries, and
9Unlike rer
PWT




n;t are only index numbers and can describe the behavior over time
of the real exchange rate, but do not provide any information about its level. Yet, these variables can still
be included into a growth regression like equation (2), as long as the estimated speci￿cation contains country
unobserved e⁄ects. Similarly, they can be used as dependent variables into a speci￿cation like (1) in order to derive
corrected measures of undervaluation, as long as we account for level-di⁄erences in the base year by including
￿xed or random e⁄ects. In particular, we chose a random e⁄ect model,which is not rejected by a Hausman test,




n;t as dependent variables.
10Notice that a question concerns the estimation method, because real exchange rates and real GDP per capita
are likely to be non-stationary and co-integrated. Then, speci￿cations like (1) are usually estimated with panel co-
integrated techniques, rather that with OLS with time dummies as in Rodrik and in this paper. However, as long
as the relevant co-integrated variable is included into the speci￿cation (1), the OLS method yields super-consistent
estimates, even though standard errors may not be well-behaved in small samples. While panel bootstrap methods
could return precise small-sample estimates of standard errors, given the very large sample size of our sample
(and the fact that proving that income per capita a⁄ects the real exchange rate is not the purpose of this study,
but a result of a ￿fty-year-old literature), we can safely use OLS.










y t-1 -0.032 -0.036 -0.031 -0.035 -0.039 -0.029 -0.037 -0.025
[7.77]*** [3.79]*** [7.27]*** [3.56]*** [5.85]*** [1.83]* [5.50]*** [1.61]
undervaluation 0.008 0.015 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.026 0.005 0.018
[2.69]*** [1.80]* [2.43]** [1.08] [2.81]*** [3.24]*** [3.11]*** [2.24]**
Constant 0.256 0.222 0.242 0.184 0.186 0.269 0.152 0.167
[9.50]*** [3.84]*** [8.40]*** [2.86]*** [4.30]*** [1.95]* [3.38]*** [1.32]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1419 729 1419 729 827 350 827 350
Number of countries 161 80 161 80 130 59 130 59
R-squared 0.39 0.48 0.38 0.47 0.36 0.51 0.35 0.49
All Countries Developing Countries
(1) Estimates of equation (2) using OLS. Robust t statistics in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%, ** at 5%,
*** at 1%.
di⁄erent measures of undervaluation.11 The coe¢ cient on undervaluation is always positive.
Corrected measures of undervaluation always return very signi￿cant coe¢ cients, while weakly
corrected measures do not return a signi￿cant coe¢ cient in one case (rerWPI
n;t on all countries).
When estimates are restricted to the sample of developing countries only ￿ de￿ned as the
countries in which real GDP per capita is below 6,000 US dollars (2005 international dollars) ￿
the estimated coe¢ cients for undervaluation tend to be larger and more signi￿cant than for the
full sample.
The estimated coe¢ cients for undervaluation, when measured by uWPI
n;t and uCPI
n;t , are
in the 1-3% range. Thus, a 30% undervaluation, as in Italy in the early 1950s, would raise
real GDP by 1.5% to 4.5% over ￿ve years (i.e. the annual rate growth would rise by 0.3%
to 0.9%). In other words, results from the estimates are not only statistically signi￿cant, but
also economically signi￿cant. Notice, also, the coe¢ cient for the initial conditions is always
signi￿cant with the predicted negative sign.
When we restrict the sample to the post-World War II period, we can consider also esti-
mates in which undervaluation is measured with uPWT
n;t , which is the most precise index (Table
2). All the coe¢ cients are positive, irrespectively of the sample of countries. However, only
the coe¢ cients for the full sample and the sample of developing countries are strongly signi￿-
cant (2-3%), while the coe¢ cient for advanced countries is considerably smaller (0.3%) and not
signi￿cant.
11It is important to note that we do not have a continuous series for consumer and wholesale price indices
(which would have implied using data that span through the World War years, see Section 5.1.1 for a discussion).
Our time series are available in three di⁄erent windows: 1861-1913, 1920-1939, and 1950-2009, each of them with
a di⁄erent base year (1900, 1929 and 2000, respectively). Hence, when estimates are performed for the whole
sample period, we have included three sets of country ￿xed e⁄ects, one for each of the three time windows. The
reason is that if equation (2) is the true data generating process, then we should expect the same slopes across
time windows but di⁄erent intercepts (due to the rebasement) for each country. In other words, the three di⁄erent
e⁄ects are meant to capture the di⁄erent degree of undervaluation in the three base years and, as a consequence,
the di⁄erent growth rates on those years. Thus, the three di⁄erent sets of ￿xed e⁄ects catch those di⁄erent
intercepts, while still providing a single estimate for the slope.
9Table 2: Economic growth and undervaluation after World War II (1950-2009): undervaluation







y t-1 -0.029 -0.038 -0.053
[6.24]*** [4.47]*** [8.61]***
undervaluation 0.016 0.026 0.003
[3.41]*** [3.99]*** [0.48]
Constant 0.297 0.31 0.556
[8.33]*** [5.08]*** [11.40]***
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1551 852 699
Number of countries 179 125 108
R-squared 0.25 0.21 0.46
(1) Estimates of equation (2) using OLS; undervaluation measured by uPWT
n;t . Robust t statistics in
brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
The picture is essentially the same when we consider the other indices of undervaluation
(Table 3). All the coe¢ cients for the full sample as well as the sample of developing countries are
strongly signi￿cant across all measures (except rerWPI
n;t ), and magnitudes are again the same (1-
3% for the corrected measures). Similarly the higher dimension of the coe¢ cient for developing
countries is also con￿rmed.
Table 4 reports the results for the period before World War II. The coe¢ cients are still
positive, even though somewhat smaller (up to 2%). The estimates are less precise due to the
dramatic decline in the number of observations. In this subsample, all the countries have an
income per capita below the threshold of 6,000 US dollars. If we choose a di⁄erent, lower thresh-
old, to separate the more advanced from developing countries (2,000 US dollars, which is close
to the median income for this subsample), we ￿nd that another fact tends to be con￿rmed: the
e⁄ect of undervaluation on economic growth tends to be stronger for less developed countries.12
While these results highlight the positive correlation between undervaluation and growth,
they do not allow to assess the direction of causality. For this, one would need to ￿nd a variable
correlated with the real exchange rate but exogenous to economic growth (an instrument). In
order to obtain at least some preliminary indications about this question, we estimate a dynamic
panel model with the di⁄erence GMM method of Arellano and Bond (1991), with additional
12For the indicator based on consumer prices, we also estimate a version of equation (2) on a country-by-country
basis. It emerges that the poorer countries in the sample (Brazil, Japan, Portugal, Italy, Spain and Norway, that
are the countries with incomes per capita below 2,000 U.S. dollars at the turn of the century) all feature positive
(albeit insigni￿cant) coe¢ cients. On the other hand, the richer countries in the sample (the United Kingdom
and Australia, with an income per capita close to or above 4,000 U.S. dollars) display negative coe¢ cients. The
negative correlation across countries between the estimated coe¢ cient and real GDP per capita is con￿rmed across
the full sample.
10Table 3: Economic growth and undervaluation after World War II (1950-2009): alternative










y t-1 -0.031 -0.035 -0.03 -0.033 -0.037 -0.023 -0.036 -0.019
[7.80]*** [3.74]*** [7.28]*** [3.51]*** [5.67]*** [1.47] [5.32]*** [1.25]
undervaluation 0.008 0.014 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.027 0.005 0.019
[2.72]*** [1.73]* [2.55]** [1.05] [2.85]*** [2.77]*** [3.17]*** [2.03]*
Constant 0.329 0.374 0.312 0.342 0.313 0.24 0.281 0.138
[11.30]*** [5.35]*** [9.95]*** [4.66]*** [6.56]*** [2.16]** [5.70]*** [1.45]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1210 538 1210 538 620 161 620 161
Number of countries 160 78 160 78 110 35 110 35
R-squared 0.34 0.41 0.33 0.4 0.24 0.3 0.22 0.27
All countries Developing countries
(1) Estimates of equation (2) using OLS. Robust t statistics in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%, ** at 5%,
*** at 1%.






y t-1 -0.084 -0.082 -0.09 -0.085
[4.69]*** [5.34]*** [3.86]*** [3.43]***
undervaluation 0.001 0.017 0.010 0.022
[0.12] [1.45] [0.83] [0.92]
Constant 0.613 0.61 0.609 0.575
[4.75]*** [5.34]*** [3.85]*** [3.43]***
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 209 191 83 64
Number of countries 33 31 19 19
R-squared 0.54 0.56 0.51 0.45
All Countries Less Developed Countries (2)
(1) Estimates of equation (2) using OLS. Robust t statistics in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%, ** at 5%,
*** at 1%. (2) Real income per capita up to 2,000 US dollars (2005 international dollars).










y t-1 0.242 0.24 0.199 0.147 0.3 -0.066 0.407 0.248
[8.80]*** [6.63]*** [5.05]*** [2.51]** [4.51]*** [0.59] [5.37]*** [2.94]***
 ln(GDP t-1) -0.043 -0.041 -0.033 -0.026 -0.026 -0.01 -0.003 0.004
[15.05]*** [10.70]*** [8.30]*** [5.21]*** [3.55]*** [1.26] [1.03] [0.85]
undervaluation 0.006 0.021 0.006 0.025 0.009 0.044 0.004 0.004
[3.40]*** [3.53]*** [3.26]*** [2.82]*** [1.90]* [4.57]*** [0.38] [0.22]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1121 577 651 275 277 80 157 145
Number of countries 156 77 123 56 60 23 32 29
Sargan test 73.72 89.4 78.79 129.31 70.8 67.66 90.38 89.82
           P value 0.45 0.09 0.30 0.00 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.00
AR (2) -1.97 -1.96 -2.82 -2.92 -1.35 -1.47 -3.12 1.53





Whole sample Pre WW II period Whole sample
Developing countries (2) All Countries
(1) Estimates of equation (2) using OLS. Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%,
** at 5%, *** at 1%. (2) Real income per capita up to 6,000 US dollars (2005 international dollars). (3)
Real income per capita up to 2,000 US dollars (2005 international dollars).
lags of GDP growth and undervaluation as instruments for the lagged dependent variable and
the independent variable.13 Using lagged values as instruments shows that the coe¢ cients for
undervaluation are positive and highly signi￿cant for the whole sample period. Coe¢ cients tend
to be higher for less developed countries (income below 6,000 or 2,000 US dollars) and smaller
and insigni￿cant for the sole pre-World War II period (for which the Sargan test warns that we
do not have valid instruments). The elasticity of growth with respect to currency misalignments
goes from 1 to 4% on the whole sample period, and from 0.4% for the period preceding World
War II.
Overall, three main facts emerge from this empirical analysis, with the ￿rst two of which
con￿rming Rodrik￿ s main ￿ndings: (i) there is a positive relationship between undervaluation
and economic growth; (ii) this relationship is strong, and both statistically and economically
signi￿cant for developing countries, while it is weak for advanced countries; (iii) these results
tend to hold for both the post- and the pre-World War II period. Elasticities of economic growth
with respect to undervaluation are generally comprised between 1-4% (both for the full sample
and for developing countries); they are as low as 0.3% for advanced countries. Results also
provide at least suggestive evidence that causality runs from undervaluation to growth. But
what is the mechanism?
In the next section, we analyze this question and develop the following hypothesis. Un-
13In our sample, the Sargan test tended to accept the null that the error term is uncorrelated with the instru-
ments when we estimated the model using Di⁄erence GMM and to reject it when we used System GMM. For an
extensive set of estimates using post 1980 data with System GMM, however, see MacDonald and Vieira (2010).
All their estimates con￿rm the main result that the relationship between undervaluation and growth is positive
and the direction of causality is likely to run from the former to the latter.
12dervaluation acts by enhancing the price competitiveness of tradeable goods and by shifting
resources from the non-tradeable-goods to the tradeable-goods sector. To the extent that pro-
ductivity in the latter sector is higher, undervaluation would successfully raise GDP growth.
3 Exchange rates and growth: a view from trade theory
We assume that the tradeable-goods sector has a higher productivity than the non-tradeable-
goods sector and we investigate the conditions under which a currency depreciation is successful
in shifting labor from the latter to the former, thereby raising output. Our working assumption
is that, in the real models of trade considered in this section, we can replicate the e⁄ects of
a nominal depreciation with a decline in the barriers to the country￿ s exports, coupled with a
symmetric rise in the barriers to the country￿ s imports.
We consider ￿rst a framework with perfect competition and constant returns to scale,
which is a modi￿ed version of the model of Eaton and Kortum (2002). Then, we turn to a model
with Bertrand competition and constant returns to scale, ￿ la Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2010).14
3.1 Perfect competition and constant returns to scale
We consider an economy with the following features: a tradeable-goods and a non-tradeable-
goods sector, each of them producing a continuum of goods; industries with heterogeneous
e¢ ciencies, described by FrØchet distributions; labor, the only production factor, is perfectly
mobile across sectors within each country and immobile across countries; the market structure
is perfect competition.15 We analyze ￿rst the closed economy and then the open economy. In
the latter, we introduce asymmetric trade barriers, modeled as Samuelson￿ s iceberg costs.
The resulting framework is a variant of the Eaton-Kortum model of trade (Eaton and
Kortum, 2002; EK hereafter), in which the non-tradeable-goods sector is explicitly modeled.
The reason for this modi￿cation is that the interplay between the tradeable-goods and non-
tradeable-goods sectors has a key role in our analysis.
14Both constant and increasing returns to scale are considered to be empirically relevant in many contexts.
Antweiler and Tre￿ er (2002), using data from 71 countries, provide the somewhat Solomonic result that at least
one third of all good-producing industries are characterized by increasing returns to scale (induced by plant-level
or industry-level externalities), while at least one third of all goods-producing industries display constant returns
to scale. Focusing on the manufacturing sector (often used as a proxy for the tradeable-goods sector), Morrison
and Siegel (1999) ￿nd that scale economies are prevalent in the U.S. and that, at least in part, they may be due
to factors that are external to ￿rms.
15While we could also consider only one single non-tradeable good, by assuming a continuum of non-tradeable
industries we preserve some symmetry with the tradeable sector, which allows to simplify the results. Analogously,
we could obtain similar results from a model with only two tradeable goods but, following the lesson of Dornbusch,
Fischer and Samuelson (1977), we consider a model with a continuum of tradeable goods in order to represent
industry productivities with a function and use the tools of calculus, simplifying the analysis neatly with respect
to the discrete many-commodity case. Finally, by exploiting the insight of Eaton and Kortum (2002) of using
speci￿c distribution functions and the language of probability to describe industry productivities, we obtain even
simpler theoretical results.
133.1.1 Closed economy








































, 8m = N;T
where the superscripts N and T distinguish non-tradeable from tradeable goods and i denotes
the country; cN
i (cT
i ) is the consumption bundle of non-tradeable (tradeable) goods; cN
i (j)
(cT
i (j)) is consumption of the non-tradeable (tradeable) good j, where goods j are indexed in
the interval [0;+1); pN
i (j) (pT
i (j)) is the price of the non-tradeable (tradeable) good j; wi is
the nominal wage; Li is labor supply; and ￿;￿ > 0 are elasticities.
The parameter ￿ in the nested CES function (3) is the elasticity of substitution between
two tradeable goods and between two non-tradeable goods; ￿ governs the elasticity of substi-
tution between tradeable and non-tradeable goods.16 This frameworks allows for both elastic
(￿;￿ ￿ 1) and inelastic demand (￿;￿ < 1). However, in the following, we implicitly assume
￿ > 1, while for ￿ we explicitly consider both ￿ ￿ 1 and ￿ < 1, the latter being the empirically-
relevant case (see Stockman and Tesar, 1995).
Goods are produced with constant returns to scale: qm
i (j) = zm
i (j)Lm
i (j), m = N;T,
where qm
i (j) is the quantity of good j of sector m produced by country i, zm
i (j) is the e¢ ciency
(productivity) of that industry j, and Lm
i (j) is the number of workers employed in that industry.
Perfect competition implies pm
i (j) = wi=zm
i (j), for any i, m, and j.
Industry productivities in the non-tradeable-goods and the tradeable-goods sector are
respectively described by ZN
i ￿ Fr￿ echet(Ni;￿) and ZT
i ￿ Fr￿ echet(Ti;￿), with Ni;Ti > 0 and
￿ > ￿. The parameters Ni and Ti are related to the ￿rst moments of, respectively, ZN
i and ZT
i :
an increase in Ni (Ti) implies an increase in the share of non-tradeable (tradeable) goods that




16The assumption that the elasticities of substitution for non-tradeable and tradeable goods are the same (equal
to ￿) can be relaxed, at the cost of a slightly more cumbersome algebra.
17If X ￿ Fr￿ echet(￿;￿), then the moment of order k of X (which exists i⁄ ￿ > k) is ￿
k=￿￿[(￿ ￿ k)=￿], where ￿
denotes Euler￿ s Gamma function. In an open economy, Ti and ￿ are the the theoretical counterparts, in a context
with many countries and a continuum of goods, of the Ricardian concepts of absolute advantage (due to the close
link of Ti with the mean of Z
T
i ) and comparative advantage (￿ is closely connected with the dispersion of Z
T
i and
the gains from trade). For some background, see Eaton and Kortum (2002).

































































where ￿q and ￿w are constants.19 These equations show: the price of the bundle of the tradeable
goods relative to that of the non-tradeable goods (equation (4)); the size of the non-tradeable-
goods sector relative to the tradeable-goods sector (equation (5)); the demand for the bundle of
non-tradeable goods relative to that of the tradeable goods (equation (6)); aggregate productivity
of the non-tradeable-goods sector relative to that of the tradeable-goods sector (equation (7));20
real GDP, i.e. aggregate production of non-tradeable and tradeable goods (equation (8));21 the
real wage (equation (9)), that, given Li, measures welfare (utility is wiLi=pi in the equilibrium).
3.1.2 Open economy
Representative consumers are identical in all countries and solve the same problem (3) described
above (analytic details are in Appendix B.2).
Prices. As in the standard Ricardian model, production and trade are governed by
comparative advantages and each good is bought from the producer who sells it at the lowest
price. Hence, the price of a tradeable good j in country i is: (i) pT
i (j) = wi=zT
i (j), if j is
domestically produced; (ii) pT
i (j) = wndin=zT
n (j), if j is imported from country n, where din
18Here we are mostly interested in the main macroeconomic aggregates, rather than in the single tradeable and
non-tradeable goods, whose equilibrium quantities and relative prices are nevertheless determined in Appendix
B.1. To economize on the notation, we report ratios not only for prices, but also for some quantities, deferring to
Appendix B.1 for details.
















20In the closed economy, it is easy to show that by aggregating production across industries in equilibrium, we






i , where A
m
i is the aggregate productivity (or labor productivity) of sector m and
L
m
i is the size of this sector. In particular, A
m
i is given by the ratio between the moment of order ￿ and the
moment of order ￿ ￿ 1 of the productivity distribution of sector m (see Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia, 2011, for
details).










i (j)dj for m = N;T. This de￿nition resembles the






where p and q are good prices and quantities at time 0, while q0 are good quantities at time 1.
15is the iceberg cost of sending one unit of good from country n to country i (where we assume
din ￿ 1, dii = 1, and the triangle inequality). Iceberg costs include transportation costs as
well as all tari⁄ and non-tari⁄ barriers to trade. The price of a non-tradeable good j is simply
pN
i (j) = wi=zN
i (j).




















































Not surprisingly, in the open economy the ratio pT
i =pN
i is lower than in autarky. Of course,
pT
i =pN
i is increasing in Ni and din, and decreasing in Ti, Tn, and wi=wn. We can also compute
the ratio between the price of tradeable goods in the open economy and the price of the same






















Hence, tradeable goods are cheaper in the open economy, because some goods that under autarky
were produced less e¢ ciently are now imported.







i , where LN
i and LT

















i = Li ￿ LT





































￿￿1=(1￿￿) (i.e. ￿p is equal to the constant ￿ in Eaton and Kortum, 2002).
16Recall that in the open economy pT
i is lower than in the closed economy. Then, equation (14)
suggests that the relative size of the tradeable-goods sector after opening to trade depends on the
exact value of the elasticity ￿. If ￿ > 1, then the share of workers in the tradeable-goods sector
rises after opening to trade, even though some domestic industries shut down. On the contrary,
if ￿ < 1, then the share of workers in the tradeable-goods sector declines, as some domestic
tradeable industries are forced out of the market.



























The main di⁄erence with respect to the autarky case is that, as discussed above, the price
index pT


























clearly, thanks to the decline in pT
i =pN
i , country i consumes a larger share of tradeable goods
after opening to trade.








Before turning to trade ￿ ows, it is worth to sum up the e⁄ects of opening to trade on
the tradeable-goods sector. First, the production of some tradeable goods ceases (and these
goods are imported). In particular, country i keeps producing the tradeable goods j such that
zT
i (j)=wi = maxn zT
n (j)=(wndin) holds (and imports the others). Second, the goods (non-
tradeables and tradeables) whose production continues to take place at home and that are sold
only domestically face a tougher competition (from foreign producers). Third, the goods whose
production continues and that are sold both domestically and abroad meet a larger demand
(less demand at home, but some additional demand from abroad). Fourth, the relative size of
the tradeable-goods sector depends on the elasticity ￿: this size increases (decreases) if ￿ > 1
(￿ < 1).
Trade. It is easy to compute the value of exports from country i to country n, using the
fact that the tradeable good j made in country i is exported in n if and only if widni=zT
i (j) <
wn=zT














and where Xni is the value of exports from country i to country n, and Xn = cT
npT
n is the total
expenditure of country n on tradeable goods. For what concerns the e⁄ect of trade barriers,
17note that the export share of country i into country n only depends on the barrier from country
i to country n, dni; the barrier from country n to country i, din, which contributes to determine
prices (equation (12)) does not have a direct e⁄ect, but only an indirect e⁄ect through relative
wages.
Average productivity. We can also compute the productivity distribution of the surviv-
ing industries. While in autarky this is described by ZT
i ￿ Fr￿ echet(Ti;￿), because all tradeable
goods are produced at home, in the open economy this is described by a new random variable,
call it ZT
i;o, such that ZT
i;o ￿ Fr￿ echet(￿i;￿), where









(see Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia, 2011, for details). Thus, the average productivity of the





, is larger than that of the closed economy.

























Of course, the productivity distribution in the non-tradeable-goods sector remains the same,




Wages, welfare, and real output. The model is closed by determining relative wages.
Income in country i, which is wiLi, must be equal to the expenditure for non-tradeable goods
and the value of its exports of tradeable goods around the world, including at home (trade
balance); that is: wiLi = wiLN
i +
P
n Xni. Hence, wiLT
i =
P



































which are always higher than in autarky, irrespectively of the exact value of relative wages wi=wn
or of the elasticity ￿.
23In the case of two countries, it is easy to compute also the productivity distribution of the exporters. This
is described by a new random variable, that we can denote by Z
T
i;e, such that Z
T
i;e ￿ Fr￿ echet(￿i;e;￿), where
￿i;e = Ti + Tn (widni=wn)
￿. Clearly, ￿i;e > ￿i, which implies that exporters are more productive than the rest
of the surviving tradeable industries, a result consistent with the "exceptional export performance" documented
by Bernard and Jensen (1999).




































For the general case, see Appendix B.2.
Equilibrium. To sum up, the full general equilibrium is given by the solution of equations
(10) (11), (13), (16) and (20), which form a system of m2+4m non-linear equations in m2+4m
unknowns (where m is the number of countries), which are: pN
i , pT
i , LT
i , wi and ￿ni. The
parameters of the model ￿ which are ￿, ￿, ￿, Ti, Ni, Li, din and dni ￿ can all be estimated
or calibrated. Because of non-linearities, there is no closed-form solution.25 Nevertheless, it is
possible to simulate the model and analyze some counterfactuals. For parameter changes such
as those concerning trade barriers, however, the model is simple enough in that it allows to ￿nd
analytic results, as we show below.26
3.1.3 Changes in trade barriers with ￿ exible and sticky wages
For simplicity, let us focus on the model with two countries only (denoted with i and n). To
simulate the e⁄ects of a depreciation of country i in a model that has no money, we consider an
increase in the barriers to its imports from country n (which makes country i￿ s imports more
expensive) and a symmetric decrease in the barriers to its exports to country n (which makes
country i￿ s exports cheaper). More formally, we consider a rise of din to d0
in = ￿din and a decline
of dni to d0
ni = dni=￿, with ￿ > 1. These changes can be interpreted as a depreciation in the
nominal exchange rate from e = 1 to e = ￿ > 1 (where the exchange rate is expressed in terms
of units of country i￿ s currency for one unit of foreign currency). For given wages wi and wn,
these changes in trade barriers reproduce exactly what happens right after a depreciation: if
good j is imported, its price increases from wndin=zn (j) to wndin￿=zn (j); if good j is exported,
its price decreases from widni=zi (j) to widni=￿zi (j); if good j is domestically produced and sold
only at home, its price does not change (and remains equal to wi=zi (j)). Let us distinguish two
polar cases: ￿ exible vs. sticky wages.
On impact (that is before wages change), the increase in din makes imports from country n
more expensive, favoring import substitution and boosting the demand for both domestic trade-
able and non-tradeable goods. By the same token, the decline in dni makes country i￿ s exports
cheaper, raising foreign demand for domestic tradeable goods. Hence, after the depreciation all
industries in the economy (tradeable and non-tradeable) require more workers, thanks to the
rise in both domestic and foreign demand.
25Results by Alvarez and Lucas (2007), however, grant that a solution of the model exists and is unique.
26Recall that the model assumes trade balance and ignores tari⁄ revenues that trade barriers might generate.
It is, however, possible to extend the model both to incorporate imbalances (see Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum,
2007) and to take revenue e⁄ects into account (see Eaton and Kortum, 2002). By the same token, the model can
be generalized to include intermediate goods (Eaton and Kortum, 2002, and Alvarez and Lucas, 2007), physical
capital (see, e.g., Shikher, 2010, and Waugh, 2010), or general distributions of industry productivities (Finicelli,
Pagano and Sbracia, 2011).
19Of course, with ￿ exible wages and full employment, the rise in demand puts pressure on
domestic wages. For the sake of simplicity, let us normalize wages in country n, setting wn = 1.
Under full employment, wi increases to exactly w0
i = ￿wi. Note that this rise in wi restores all
equilibrium quantities and relative prices to their pre-depreciation levels.27 In other words, the
result of the depreciation is just a change in all the nominal variables (wages and prices), so that
all real variables (quantities and relative prices) return to the previous equilibrium levels.
Clearly, whether and when the pre-depreciation equilibrium quantities and relative prices
are reestablished depends on the degree of ￿ exibility of wages and prices. If, for instance,
unlimited labor supply in a low-income country prevents wages from rising, then competitive
gains remain.
To make this argument more formal, suppose that wages are sticky in country i and, in
particular, suppose that they are set to a level wi which is too high to deliver full employment.
In other words, Li is lower than the full employment level. Let us consider the e⁄ects of a
depreciation in this framework.28
Hence, assume that din raises to d0
in = ￿din and dni declines to d0
ni = din=￿, with ￿ >
1. As before, the rise in din makes imports from country n more expensive, favoring import
substitution, and increasing the demand for domestic tradeable goods. By the same token, the
rise in dni makes country i￿ s exports cheaper, augmenting foreign demand for domestic tradeable
goods. Thus, LT
i increases (equation (20)), because both ￿ni and ￿ii increase. On the other
hand, the increase in din raises the price of the bundle of tradeable goods pT
i (because the goods
that are still imported and the new domestically-produced tradeable goods are more expensive)
and, therefore, demand for non-tradeable goods increases (equation (15)).
Thus, employment rises in both sectors, boosting real GDP. Note that the intuition ac-
cording to which a depreciation makes the tradeable-goods sector more competitive and raises
the size of this sector depends on the exact value of the elasticity of substitution between trade-
able and non-tradeable goods. If ￿ > 1, then the absolute size of the tradeable-goods sector
rises due to the increase in employment (equation (20)), but the relative size of this sector (with
respect to the non-tradeable-goods sector) declines (equation (14)). If ￿ < 1, then both the
absolute and the relative size of the tradeable-goods sector rise. Notice that the case ￿ < 1
is the one which is empirically relevant. In particular, using cross-sectional data from the In-
ternational Comparison Program, Stockman and Tesar (1995) have estimated an elasticity of
substitution between tradeable and non-tradeable goods equal to 0:44. Following their study,
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models usually calibrate ￿ at around 0:5.
27For wn normalized to 1, a simple inspection of equations (10) (11), (13), (16) and (20) reveals that if wi
solves the model (together with the other endogenous variables) for given din and dni (and given all the other
parameters), then, for any ￿ > 0, all the equations also hold if w
0
i = ￿wi, d
0
in = ￿din and d
0
ni = dni=￿ replace,
respectively, wi, din and dni. Uniqueness of the equilibrium grants that w
0
i = ￿wi is the domestic wage that solves





28Broadly speaking, while so far we have considered Li given (set at its full employment level) and wi endoge-
nous, now we consider the polar case in which wi is given and Li is endogenous.
203.2 Bertrand competition and increasing returns to scale
We now remove the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale and re-
place them with Bertrand competition and increasing returns to scale, following the model of
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010; GRH hereafter). We consider two countries, that we keep
on labeling with i and n. As in the previous section, there is a continuum of tradeable goods,
denoted with j 2 [0;+1). For the sake of simplicity, we now focus on tradeable goods only:
in fact, we already know from the previous section that the direction in which workers ￿ ow
in and out the tradeable-goods and non-tradeable-goods sectors depends solely on the change









Hereafter, we follow GRH closely, making only one main departure. GRH consider trade
barriers that are industry speci￿c and symmetric between countries. Here, instead, we consider
trade barriers that, as in the previous section, are identical across industries but not necessarily
symmetric across countries.29 An extension to trade barriers that are not symmetric between
countries nor identical across sectors, however, would be straightforward using GRH and this
paper.
3.2.1 Autarky and free trade equilibria
We retain the same notation as in the previous sections and replace constant returns to scale
with increasing returns to scale by assuming
qT
i (j) = zT







where Aj is a function with A0
j > 0, A00
j < 0, and elasticity smaller than 1. For example,









￿(￿￿1)=￿, where ￿ > 1, used in Ethier (1982), ful￿lls these
properties.
In models with perfect competition and external economies of scale, such as Ethier (1982),
industries are composed of small ￿rms that act as price takers and treat industry-scale produc-
tivities as given. Firms correctly recognize their own productivity when they make decisions
about price and quantities, but do not perceive the possibility of a⁄ecting industry output and
prices. By assuming Bertrand competition, instead, in this model ￿rms are no longer price tak-
ers and perceive that, by raising output and producing at a larger scale, they can abate average
costs and shave prices.
In each country i, it is assumed that there are at least two identical potential producers of
good j. This assumption, coupled with Bertrand competition, is pivotal in returning a unique
equilibrium in a framework with increasing returns to scale. The presence of many ￿rms with
the same productivity implies zero pro￿ts and, under autarky, that ￿rms charge a price equal to
their average cost. In addition, if there are multiple intersections between the demand and the
cost curve (as it may happen with increasing returns to scale) and, then, potentially multiple
equilibria with di⁄erent prices and quantities, the fact that each ￿rm recognizes that it raises its
29In other words, GRH consider trade barriers from country i to country n for good j, dni (j), with following
properties: dni (j) = din (j) 8(i;n) and 8j, and dni (j) Q dni (j
0) 8(i;n) and 8j 6= j
0. Here, we consider trade
barriers dni (j) such that dni (j) = dni (j
0) = dni 8(i;n) and 8j 6= j
0, and dni Q din 8(i;n).
21Figure 2: Multiple intersections of demand and cost curves
market share by shaving the price is su¢ cient to select a unique equilibrium. The equilibrium
is at the intersection between the demand and the cost curve characterized by the lowest price
and the highest production.
This result is illustrated by GRH by means of a simple example. Suppose that the demand
(DD) and cost (CC) curves have multiple intersections, as in Figure 2 (which corresponds to
Figure II in GRH). Neither E0 nor E00 represents an equilibrium, because if ￿rms charge a price
associated with these points, then a deviant ￿rm can announce a lower price for good j, get
the whole market, and make positive pro￿ts. Hence, the equilibrium in each industry j is at
the lowest intersection of the demand and cost curve, so long as the former cuts the latter from
above. In this equilibrium, an arbitrary number of ￿rms make sales and earn zero pro￿ts. Note
that further shaving the price from the point E in Figure 2 is not feasible, because the deviant
￿rm would not be able to cover its costs. On the other hand, if the demand curve cuts the cost
curve from below, then the price of good j would tend to zero and its production to in￿nity.
Imposing that the demand curve cuts the cost curve from above, then, grant existence and
uniqueness of an industry equilibrium with ￿nite production.















i , wi, and LT
i are de￿ned in the previous section. The cost curve for the ￿rm
producing a quantity qT









i (j) is de￿ned above. A su¢ cient condition for the existence of an industry equilibrium





< 1 for any qT


















.30 This condition is always ful￿lled, for instance, if ￿ > 1 (as we assume in
this paper) and Aj = ￿ Aj (as in Ethier, 1982).
The autarky and the free trade equilibria can be easily determined. In the former, equi-
librium quantities are cT
i (j) = qT
i (j), with cT










where wages wi could be normalized to one. Equations (22) and (23) jointly determine equi-
librium quantities and relative prices.31 In general, this competitive equilibrium is not Pareto
e¢ cient, due to the presence of production externalities. Pareto e¢ ciency is established, how-
ever, in the special case in which all industries bear a constant and common degree of scale
economies (such as if Aj = ￿ Aj 8j; see GRH for details).
With free trade (dni = din = 1), demand is still given by equation (22), while the equilib-
rium price of good j in countries i and n (recall that the law of one price holds, absent trade
barriers) is
pT
i (j) = pT








n (j)Aj [~ qT (j)]
￿
, (24)
where ~ qT (j) = cT
i (j) + cT
n (j), while cT
i (j) and cT
n (j) are the same as in equation (22). A
remarkable result of GRH, then, is that, with free trade, the patter of specialization conforms
to the pattern of comparative advantages: good j is produced in the country that makes it at
the lowest cost, once that costs are evaluated at the common scale ~ qT (j). In addition, there are
no multiple equilibria: the possibility of multiple locations for a given industry disappears when
￿rms recognize that their own average cost declines as the scale of production rises.
3.2.2 Non-negligible trade barriers
We now turn to the empirically relevant case of non-negligible trade barriers. Solving for the
equilibrium becomes substantially harder with respect to both the model with increasing returns
to scale and no trade barriers and the model with constant returns to scale and trade barriers.
Relative to the former, we have to account for the fact that domestic ￿rms enjoy a cost advantage
relative to foreign ￿rms as they can serve the domestic market without incurring trade barriers.
With respect to the latter, here a ￿rm servicing only the domestic market faces a disadvantage
relative to ￿rms that sell goods in both markets, because produces at a smaller scale. Like GRH,
we focus on the somewhat simpler case of segmented markets, that is the case in which ￿rms
can announce di⁄erent prices in di⁄erent geographic locations.32
Let us focus on country i. In the equilibrium, some domestic industries export their goods,
others serve only the domestic market, while other goods are imported. Let us analyze these
three cases, starting from exports.
30Formally, this is the same as the condition of "Marshallian stability" (that is of stability with respect to
perturbations of equilibrium quantities) invoked by Ethier (1982).
31Although one can always set one price, usually nominal wages, as the numeraire (wi = 1), we prefer to keep
wi (as both EK and GRH), because it improves the clarity of the arguments.
32In the polar case of integrated markets, price di⁄erences across di⁄erent geographic locations cannot exceed
the value of trade barriers. Results for this case are qualitatively similar to those for segmented markets.
23Suppose for a moment that ￿rms ignore the possibility of targeting a single market, and




















n (j)Aj [~ qT (j)]
￿
cT
n (j) ￿ 0 . (25)
The ￿rst (second) addendum in (25) is the revenue that a ￿rm of country n obtains by shaving
slightly the price of good j in country i (country n).33 This inequality grants that a ￿rm located
in n does not pro￿t from selling in both countries i and n. Simple as it is, inequality (25)
marks a very sharp di⁄erence with respect to the model with constant returns to scale. In
particular, ￿rms in country n may have an incentive to export good j in country i even if they
make negative pro￿ts in that country (￿rst addendum is negative), provided that they make
large enough positive pro￿ts at home. In this case, country n sells good j in country i in order
to produce at larger scale scale, cut its average cost, and make large enough pro￿ts at home.
This possibility is precluded in models with constant returns to scale, because there is no cost
advantage from producing at a higher scale.34 Inequality (25) also suggests that country i can
protect its domestic industries and encourage exports by lifting din and lowering dni ￿ which
is precisely what happens with a currency depreciation.35
Even if (25) is satis￿ed, good j is not necessarily exported by country i. A deviant ￿rm
located in country n could still undermine country i￿ s exports by targeting its own market only.












n (j) ￿ 0 . (26)
Thus, good j is produced by country i and sold both at home and abroad if and only
if inequalities (25) and (26) are satis￿ed. Note that, of these two conditions, we do not know
which one is more restrictive. If trade barriers vanish (din;dni ! 1), then it is condition (26)
that is more restrictive (and this inequality collapses to condition (24)). For non-negligible trade
barriers, instead, it may be condition (25) that determines whether country i exports good j.
This is going to have a crucial importance when we analyze the e⁄ects of a currency depreciation.
Let us now turn to non-exported goods. Good j is produced by i and sold only at home
if and only if the following three conditions are satis￿ed: (i) inequality (25) holds (i.e. country































34Recall that Bertrand competition in the presence of many identical ￿rms implies zero pro￿ts, as in the model
with perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Roughly speaking, however, with economies of scale there
are two ways of making zero pro￿ts. As with constant returns to scale, one way is to set prices equal to average
costs in all markets. Another way is to set prices lower than average costs in some markets, and higher than
average costs in some other markets.
35This possibility is more than just a theoretical speculation. In the early post-World War II period, one of
Italy￿ s most important manufacturing companies, FIAT, sold cars at a loss in foreign markets. The aggressive
export strategy adopted by Vittorio Valletta, FIAT general manager at that time, was feasible because pro￿ts
could be made in the domestic market, also thanks to the high tari⁄ barriers imposed to foreign producers (see
Eichengreen, 2007, pp. 112-116, and Fauri, 1996).
24n does not have an incentive to sell in both i and n); (ii) inequality (26) does not hold (i.e.
























i (j)Aj [~ qT (j)]
￿
cT
n (j) ￿ 0 ; (27)
when inequality (27) is satis￿ed, ￿rms in country i do not have an incentive to deviate and
capture both markets.
Inequality (27) can be violated even while the ￿rst two conditions are satis￿ed. In this
case, there is no equilibrium in pure pricing strategies, but there is at least one symmetric







in the domestic market, while ￿rms in country i randomize among
two pricing strategies: one yields only local sales, the other yields sales in both markets (for a
characterization of these mixed strategies, see GRH).37
There are still two possibilities left. One is that country i produces and sells domestically
good j, while ￿rms in country n adopt a mixed pricing strategy (that is the reciprocal of the
previous case). The other is that good j is imported by country i (that is the reciprocal of the
￿rst case). In particular, country i imports good j if and only if: (i) inequality (25) does not















i (j) ￿ 0 , (28)
i.e. no ￿rm in country i has incentive to deviate using a pricing strategy that targets the domestic
market. Clearly, imports will be lower, the higher the import barrier din (because ￿rms in n have
less incentives to sell in i and ￿rms in i have more incentives to target at least their domestic
market).38
Figure 3 shows the possible allocation of the production of one good j for di⁄erent values
of zi (j)=zn (j) in both the cases on non-negligible trade barriers and free trade. With trade
barriers, country i exports good j with a pure pricing strategy, provided that its relative pro-
ductivity is su¢ ciently high; produces and sells at home and abroad good j using a mixed
pricing strategy for somewhat lower levels of relative productivities; produces and sells good j
only domestically for still lower levels of relative productivities, while country n produces the
same good and either sells it both at home and abroad with a mixed strategy, or sells it only
at home; imports good j for the lowest levels of zi (j)=zn (j) (Figure 3, upper panel). Not all
36The presence of mixed pricing strategies is not surprising given the fact that ￿rms are no longer price tak-
ers. For an early exploration of mixed pricing strategies in international trade with Bertrand competition (and
integrated markets), see Venables (1994).
37Symmetric equilibria can be more than one. These multiple equilibria, however, share the same qualitative
features, even though they di⁄er in their mixing probabilities. In particular, in all these equilibria good j is either
produced and exported by country i, or it is not traded.
38Appendix C rearranges the conditions under which the production of good j occurs in country i, in country
n, or in both countries (with either pure or mixed pricing strategies).
25Figure 3: Allocation of production for one industry, relative productivities, and trade barriers
these possibilities necessarily coexist. The simultaneous presence of the ￿ve zones in the upper
panel of Figure 3, in fact, depends on industry speci￿c factors (such as the degree of increasing
returns to scale) as well as trade barriers. For some goods, for instance, mixed strategies and
strategies targeting only the domestic market may not be feasible. In particular, when trade
barriers decline, the three central zones in the upper panel of Figure 3 shrink, up to the point in
which, under free trade, only complete specialization is feasible: each good j is either imported,
or it is domestically produced and sold both at home and abroad (Figure 3, lower panel).
3.2.3 Changes in trade barriers
What happens if the import barrier din raises to d0
in = ￿din and the export barrier dni sym-
metrically declines to d0
ni = din=￿ (with ￿ > 1)? On impact (that is, before wages start rising),
more goods are exported and less goods are imported. In fact, for what concerns exports, both
inequalities (25) and (26) are ful￿lled also for smaller values of zi (j)=zn (j) (i.e. for relatively
less productive ￿rms of country i). Similarly, for what concerns imports, the reciprocal of (25)
and inequality (13) are not ful￿lled only for smaller values of zi (j)=zn (j) (i.e. now only less-
e¢ ciently produced goods are imported). In general, in industries in which all the ￿ve zones in
the upper panel of Figure 3 coexist, all the four zone-borders move leftwards.
How do wages respond to the change in trade barriers? Similarly to what happens in
the model with constant returns to scale, wages tend to rise. With increasing returns to scale,
however, there are some major di⁄erences. The most important is that an increase in relative
wages to w0
i=w0
n = ￿wi=wn does not restore the previous equilibrium (the one before the change
in trade barriers). It is easy to check that inequality (25) keeps holding for smaller values of
zi (j)=zn (j) also after such a change in relative wages. In other words, more goods will be
exported also after a rise in relative wages by ￿%. By the same token, the same inequality
26will continue to be violated only for smaller values of zi (j)=zn (j), so that less goods will be
imported.
The intuition for this result is the following. With increasing returns to scale, a deprecia-
tion by (￿ ￿ 1)% cuts ￿rms￿average costs by more than (￿ ￿ 1)%, thanks to the additional cost
gains that come from the economies of scale. This is important, in particular, for the ￿rms (at
home and abroad) that target both the domestic and the foreign market, whose success in this
strategy depends on whether inequality (25) is satis￿ed. In particular, less foreign ￿rms ￿nd it
convenient to target both markets, favoring import substitution (if foreign ￿rms keep serving
at least their own market) and exports (if they shut down). On the other hand, more domestic
￿rms of country i have an incentive to start serving both the home and the foreign market,
further boosting exports.
Relative wages, however, could rise above ￿wi=wn. While this is a possibility, it is easy to
show that there is no rise in relative wages that can restore the previous equilibrium. Again, the
intuition is quite simple. Because the degree of increasing returns to scale are di⁄erent across
industries (Aj Q Aj0 if j 6= j0), the decline in average costs after the depreciation connected
to rise in output is also di⁄erent across industries. However, even though increasing returns to
scale were the same across industries, industries are nevertheless heterogeneous in productivities.
Starting from di⁄erent productivity levels, the decline in average costs would then be di⁄erent
across industries. Hence, the pre-depreciation equilibrium quantities and relative prices cannot
be restored across all industries (for a formal argument, see Appendix C). After the depreciation,
the economy converges to a new equilibrium with higher (relative) wages, but with some ￿rms
that can now access the foreign markets, and some goods that are no longer imported and are
domestically produced.
How does the size of the tradeable sector change? Recall that, under the standard as-
sumption that ￿ < 1, workers ￿ ow to the sector in which the rise in prices is larger. Of course,
productivities do not change in the non-tradeable sector and the prices of the tradeable goods
that were already domestically produced also do not change. On the other hand, the price of
the tradeable goods that the country keeps importing is now higher (due to the rise in import
tari⁄s), while the price of the newly locally produced tradeable goods is also higher (with re-
spect to when they were imported by more e¢ cient foreign ￿rms). Hence, the relative price of
tradeable goods pT
i =pN
i rises, attracting workers from the non-tradeable sector.
The e⁄ect on output is also straightforward, given that more workers ￿ ow to the high
productivity tradeable sector (if productivity in the latter is high enough, this e⁄ect occurs
even though some workers ￿ ow to the least productive ￿rms of the tradeable sector). On the
other hand, the e⁄ect on welfare is uncertain (because barriers to imports rise, while barriers
to exports decline) and need to be analyzed by counterfactual simulations ￿ an issue that we
leave for future research.
27Part II
Italy 1861-2011
4 Undervaluation of the lira/euro and Italy￿ s exports
In this section we ask whether undervaluation has helped to boost Italy￿ s exports. We consider,
in turn, their rate of growth, their nominal and real value, and their extensive margin (the
number of distinct goods sold abroad).
Our data span the following periods: 1862-1939 (from Bank of Italy and Federico, Tattara
and Vasta, 2011); 1940-1950 (Bank of Italy); 1962-1999 (NBER); and 2000-2009 (U.N. Com-
trade).39 Commodities are classi￿ed by 4-digit SITC category (about 750 distinct categories).
Data for 1862-1950 include only Italy￿ s 10 major partner countries.40 For 1962-2009 we consider
the 61 partner countries included in Bank of Italy￿ s competitiveness indicators (see Finicelli,
Liccardi and Sbracia, 2005). This sample encompasses all the countries that are important
either at a global level and for Italy￿ s trade.
We include information on nominal GDP (expressed in US dollars) and our three main
measures of undervaluation (uPWT
n;t , uCPI
n;t and uWPI
n;t ). The sources for nominal GDP in US
dollars are the IMF for the post-World War II period and Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and
Martinez-Peria (2001), complemented with national sources, for the pre-World War II period.41
4.1 Export growth
The main variable of interest is the US dollar value of Italy￿ s exports of good j to country n
at time t. Since the data set is made of bilateral exports, we also express undervaluation as a
bilateral variable. Speci￿cally, we calculate Italy￿undervaluation to the currency of country n in
year t as um
IT;t￿um
n;t, where um
i;t is the undervaluation of country i￿ s currency at time t according
to the measure m (where m = PWT, CPI or WPI, as in Section 2).
The channel through which undervaluation a⁄ects growth ￿ as described in Section 3
￿ is by reallocating resources to the tradeable sector and boosting exports through enhanced
price competitiveness. To verify whether this channel was at work for Italy since uni￿cation,
we reestimate a version of equation (2) in which we replace GDP growth with export growth as
dependent variable:
gEXP






+ dt + "n;t (29)
39For the earlier periods (1862-1939), we cross-checked the consistency of the aggregate data with those reported
in other sources, such as Stringher (1911) and Ercolani (1981).
40These countries are: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, United
Kingdom and United States. For Russia, however, data on exchange rates and consumer or wholesale prices only
start in 1990, so this country is actually excluded from the pre-World War II subsample.
41We have also gathered a set of unilateral controls (population, geographic dimension and continent) and
bilateral controls (geographic distance, colonial ties and common language). Nonetheless, these controls have
not been used in the empirical analysis, since the three dimensions of the data set (destination market, year
and commodity), as well as the large sample size (around one million of observations), allowed to include all-
encompassing time and country-pair dummies.
28Table 6: Export growth and undervaluation (1)
 u
PWT (2)  u
CPI  u
WPI  u
PWT (2)  u
CPI  u
WPI  u
PWT (2)  u
CPI  u
WPI
x t-1 -0.85 -0.81 -0.84 -0.8 -0.75 -0.78 -1.15 -1.06 -1.07
[109.23]*** [101.95]*** [93.70]*** [102.55]*** [97.37]*** [90.31]*** [106.31]*** [95.67]*** [88.44]***
Undervaluation -0.34 -0.07 -0.11 -0.28 -0.08 -0.13 -0.17 -0.01 -0.06
[15.91]*** [6.30]*** [5.08]*** [14.62]*** [8.72]*** [7.75]*** [5.95]*** [0.84] [3.46]***
Constant 7.5 7.62 7.89 -2.19 -1.73 -1.72 0.41 0.17 0.48
[27.26]*** [42.96]*** [43.81]*** [8.43]*** [11.88]*** [11.84]*** [29.56]*** [7.00]*** [24.30]***
Country-good fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 192780 196877 167298 192780 196877 167298 106083 110533 93144
Number of id 44276 43376 39459 44276 43376 39459 29192 28303 25922
R-squared 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.14 0.12 0.12
(C) (A) (B)
(1) Robust t statistics in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. (2) Sample period:
1962-2007. (A) Estimates of equation (29) using OLS. (B) Estimates of equation (30) using OLS. (C)
Estimates of a dynamic panel version of equation (30) using GMM as in Arellano and Bond (1991).
where gEXP
n;t;j is the growth rate of Italy￿ s exports of good j to country n at time t; xn;t￿1 (the log
of nominal GDP in US dollars) controls for the initial conditions; dt controls for time-speci￿c
unobserved e⁄ects; ￿n;j are country-good ￿xed e⁄ects; "n;t is the residual; and ￿;￿ 2 R. To
preserve some consistency with the estimates of equation (2), in this preliminary analysis our
series are ￿ve-year averages , in which case, t represents non-overlapping ￿ve-year periods.42
Due to the presence of time dummies, um
IT;t￿um
n;t simpli￿es to um
n;t. If undervaluation of the
lira/euro raises Italy￿ s export growth, we expect ￿ to be negative (we expect that overvaluation
of a destination market￿ s currency raises Italy￿ s exports to the country in question). Note also
that, since undervaluation acts on growth by reallocating resources to the export sector, we
expect it to have a larger impact on exports than on GDP.
Panel A of Table 6 shows the estimates. The coe¢ cients for undervaluation are strongly
signi￿cant with the predicted negative sign across all measures um
n;t. The elasticities are also
noticeably larger than in the growth regression of Section 2, as anticipated.43
A limitation of this speci￿cation is that it does not consider industry-speci￿c and time-
varying trade barriers. Nor do we control for other sector-speci￿c and time-varying e⁄ects such
as potentially heterogeneous world industry growth).44 We therefore consider an alternative




n;t into our regressions, we include, as in Section 2, two additional set of country
￿xed e⁄ects (for the pre-World War II and the interwar period) in the speci￿cation. These ￿xed e⁄ects are
intended to account for the fact that CPIs and WPIs are price indices with three di⁄erent base years (1900, 1929
and 2000). In other words, they are meant to capture the di⁄erent e⁄ect of undervaluation on the dependent
variable in the base year.
43The two elasticities, however, are not completely comparable because, in equation (2), GDP growth is referred
to a panel of countries, while in equation (29), export growth is referred only to Italy.
44Given that we have a long time span (in which trade barriers and industry growth have been rather hetero-
geneous), this problem is likely to a⁄ect our estimates. For example, heterogeneous sectoral growth may a⁄ect
GDP growth in countries with di⁄erent specialization. In this case, we would be omitting a variable correlated
with other independent variables, biasing the estimates of all the coe¢ cients.
29speci￿cation in which each variable (including the dependent variable) has been demeaned by
netting for the average across countries:
gEXP
n;t;j ￿ ￿ gEXP
:;t;j = (￿n;j ￿ ￿ ￿:;j) + ￿ (xn;t￿1 ￿ ￿ x:;t￿1) + ￿(um
n;t ￿ ￿ um
:;t) + ("n;t;j ￿ ￿ ":;t;j) .
Adding time dummies and accounting for the fact that country-sector ￿xed e⁄ects encompass
sector e⁄ects, this speci￿cation simpli￿es to:
~ gEXP
n;t;j = ￿n;j + ￿xn;t￿1 + ￿um
n;t + dt + ￿n;t;j . (30)
where ~ gEXP
n;t;j = gEXP
n;t;j ￿ ￿ gEXP
n;t;j and ￿n;t;j is the residual.45 By estimating the e⁄ect of um
n;t in
equation (30), we test whether the growth of Italy￿ s exports of good j to country n at time
t are higher with respect to Italy￿ s average export growth of the same good in the same year
because the undervaluation of the lira/euro with respect to country n￿ s currency was larger
(after controlling for other determinants of gEXP
n;t;j ). Panel B of Table 6 reports the results
of the estimates of equation (30), which con￿rm the previous results: the sign and statistical
signi￿cance of the coe¢ cients for undervaluation is consistent across measures.
In panel C, we control for the possible endogeneity of undervaluation by estimating a
dynamic panel model with the GMM method of Arellano and Bond (1991). The main result
that undervaluation raises signi￿cantly export growth is supported for two out of three measures.
4.2 Value of exports
The previous results con￿rm the importance of undervaluation for Italy￿ s export growth. How-
ever, in a more traditional analysis, we can use annual data to estimate gravity-like speci￿ca-
tions, augmented to include the undervaluation of the lira/euro. This allows us to test whether
undervaluation a⁄ects the level of Italy￿ s exports. We estimate variants of the equation:






+ Zn;j + Zt + "n;t;j , (31)
where yn;t;j denotes the log of the value of Italy￿ s exports of good j to country n at time t; xn;t
is the log of country n￿ s GDP at time t; um
IT;t is the undervaluation of the lira/euro (computed
as in Section 2, but using annual data instead of ￿ve-year averages); um
n;t is the undervaluation
for country n; Zn;j and Zt are sets of controls that are, respectively, constant across time (such
as the geographic distance between Italy and country n) and constant across country-good pairs
(such as Italy￿ s GDP); and a;b;c 2 R.
When we include ￿xed e⁄ects (country-goods pairs) and time dummies, and demean the
variables, the gravity equation (31) boils down to:
~ yn;t;j = an;j + ￿xn;t + ￿um
n;t + dt + vn;t;j (32)
45Note that this transformation of the data may generate heteroskedasticity in the error term. However, due
to the large number of countries, this is likely to be a second-order issue (recall also that heteroskedasticity does
not bias the estimates and only a⁄ects standard errors). In some robustness tests, we have addressed this issue
by performing estimates in which we cluster the error term. We have also estimated a random e⁄ect model
using GLS. Results from these models con￿rm the main ￿ndings. The main coe¢ cients preserve their sign and
statistical signi￿cance.
30where ~ yn;t;j = yn;t;j ￿ ￿ y￿;t;j; ￿n;j and dt still denote, respectively, country-good ￿xed e⁄ects and
time dummies; vn;t;j is the residual; and ￿,￿ 2 R.46 This simpli￿cation is due to the fact that
the e⁄ect of any Zn;j is captured by the ￿xed e⁄ects and, similarly, the set of time dummies
controls for the impact of any Zt (such as Italy￿ s GDP). Note that, among the variables that
dt controls for, there is also the US CPI; hence, we can interpret regression (32) as explaining
the nominal value or the real value of exports (i.e. the nominal value of exports in US dollars
divided by the US CPI, see, for example, Eichengreen, Perkins and Shin, 2011). As for equations
(29) and (30), the level of Italy￿ s undervaluation (uIT;t) is also captured by the time dummies.
If undervaluation is successful in boosting exports, we expect ￿ to be negative. By estimating
equation (32), we attempt to verify whether Italy￿ s exports of good j to country n at time t are
di⁄erent with respect to the cross-country average of Italy￿ s exports of the same good during
the same year, because the undervaluation of the lira/euro with respect to country n￿ s currency
was larger (after controlling for other possible determinants of this ￿ ow, such as the "mass" of
country n, its distance from Italy, etc.).
Table 7 reports the estimated coe¢ cients for the two main measures of undervaluation
uPWT
n;t and uCPI
n;t .47 Results show that undervaluation is signi￿cant and with its predicted neg-
ative sign (recall that un;t is the undervaluation of partner n￿ s currency, i.e. it represents the
relative overvaluation of Italy￿ s currency). Elasticities of exports to undervaluation are very high
(in the order of 20%) when the latter is measured by uWPI
n;t ; in this case a 30% undervaluation
of Italy￿ s currency (such as the one observed in the1950s) boosts its exports by about 6% per
year.
Panel B of Table 7 estimates a speci￿cation that allows for a di⁄erential e⁄ect of under-
valuation on the exports of primary goods (those in the SITC categories 1-4),48 by including the
interaction of un;t with a dummy variable for primary products.49 The coe¢ cient of the inter-
action term is positive and signi￿cant, meaning that the e⁄ect of undervaluation is diversi￿ed
across primary and industrial goods. The elasticity of primary-goods exports to undervaluation,
which is measured by the sum between the coe¢ cient of un;t and that of the interaction term,
remains negative. The size of the elasticity for industrial goods (given by the coe¢ cient of un;t)
is about 10 percentage points higher than for primary goods. Evidently, undervaluation pro-
vides some support to the exports of primary products, but it is especially helpful to the exports
of industrial goods.50
46The Hausman test strongly rejects the null that unobserved country-sector factors can be considered random
and selects the ￿xed-e⁄ects model.
47The third measure, u
WPI
n;t , provides insigni￿cant estimates. Note that because the Penn World Table is
available for the period 1950-2009 and, for that period, trade data are available only from 1962, when we use
u
PWT
n;t the sample years are only from 1962 to 2009.
48Primary sectors are: Food and live animals; Beverages and tobacco; Crude materials, inedible, except fuels;
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials; Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes. Non-primary sec-
tors are: Chemicals and related products; Manufactured goods classi￿ed by material; Machinery and transport
equipment; Miscellaneous manufactured articles; Commodities and transactions N.E.C..








, where dprim is the dummy for
the primary goods. In fact, the speci￿cation (32) comes from the gravity equation (31), after demeaning all the
variables and including country-good ￿xed e⁄ects and time dummies (and dprim ￿ u
PWT
:;t , unlike other variables,
would not simplify away).
50Similarly, Colacelli (2010) ￿nds that the elasticity of exports to the real exchange rate is signi￿cantly larger for
31Table 7: Export value and undervaluation (1)
(B)
 u
PWT (2)  u
CPI  u
PWT (2)
x t 0.67 0.79 0.65
[80.33]*** [87.38]*** [77.98]***






Constant -1.05 -0.05 -1.38
[2.34]** [0.00] [2.41]**
Country-good fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 919628 934599 919628
Number of id 48420 46686 48420
R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.12
(A)
(1) Robust t statistics in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. (2) Sample period: 1962-
2009. (A) OLS estimates of equation (32). (B) OLS estimates of equation (32), including an interaction
term.
A ￿ner disaggregation of di⁄erential e⁄ects can be obtained by estimating a separate
coe¢ cient for each of the 10 sectors classi￿ed under SITC at the 1-digit level. The estimated
speci￿cation becomes:
~ yn;t;j = ￿n;j + ￿xn;t + ￿sum
n;t + dt + vn;t;j , (33)
where ￿s (s = 1;:::;10) depends on the SITC 1-digit level classi￿cation of good j. Results, shown
in Table 8, con￿rm that the e⁄ect of undervaluation is quite di⁄erent across sectors: Italy￿ s
exports in all industrial sectors except chemicals are positively a⁄ected by undervaluation of
the lira/euro. On the other hand, Italy￿ s exports in some primary sectors tend to be negatively
a⁄ected or una⁄ected.
Overall, these results con￿rm that undervaluation of the lira/euro has a positive e⁄ects on
Italy￿ s export growth. In particular, the contribution is signi￿cantly stronger for non-primary
sectors, in which productivity is generally supposed to be higher.
4.3 Extensive margin
To analyze whether undervaluation has increased the number of varieties exported, we construct
a measure of extensive margin following Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Bergin and Lin (2008).
This is a weighted sum of the number of goods exported with weights given by the value of
exports of each good over world exports across all goods. It is available only for the period
1962-2000, because we do not have data on world exports by destination market and commodity
di⁄erentiated goods than for homogeneous goods. This partition of goods resembles ours, because most primary
goods are homogeneous and most non-primary goods are di⁄erentiated.
32Table 8: Export value and undervaluation, by sector (1)
 u
PWT (2)  u
CPI (3)
x t 0.67 0.78
[79.19]*** [87.71]***
 Food and live animals -0.44 -0.02
[8.56]*** [2.07]**
Beverages and Tobacco -0.55 0.02
[4.22]*** [0.63]
Crude materials inedible except fuels 0.17 0.02
[3.13]*** [2.31]**
Mineral fuels lubrificants and related materials 0.49 0.03
[3.59]*** [0.95]
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes -0.45 0.03
[4.25]*** [1.01]
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s -0.05 0.04
[1.35] [3.36]***
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material -0.33 -0.02
[12.78]*** [3.08]***
Machinery and trasport equipment -0.17 0.00
[5.78]*** [0.42]
Miscellaneous manufactured articles -0.21 -0.03
[5.64]*** [3.10]***
Commodities and transaction N.E.C. -0.67 -0.11
[3.76]*** [2.16]**
Country-good fixed effects YES YES
Year dummies YES YES
Observations 904012 919256
Number of groups 48266 46679
R-squared 0.10 0.18
(1) Estimates of equation (33) using OLS. Robust t statistics in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%, ** at 5%,
*** at 1%. Coe¢ cients that are signi￿cant and have the predicted sign are in bold. (2) Sample period:
1962-2007.















Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Observations 2365 2365
Number of id 62
R-squared 0.35
(1) Estimates of equation (34). Robust t statistics in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
Sample period: 1962-2007.
before 1962. We estimate the following speci￿cation:
extn;t = ￿n + ￿xn;t + ￿uPWT
n;t + dt + ￿n;t , (34)
where extn;t is the extensive margin of Italy￿ s export to country n at time t, ￿n are country ￿xed
e⁄ects, xn;t, un;t, and dt are the same variables as above. The ￿rst column of Table 9 shows
the results of the OLS estimates of equation (34). While the estimated coe¢ cient of uPWT
n;t has
its predicted negative sign, it is not signi￿cant. Note, however, that extn;t is a proportion and,
therefore, always included in the interval (0;1). For this reason, we have also estimated equation
(34) using a fractional logit model. The second column of Table 9 reports the results of these
estimates, and show that the coe¢ cient of uPWT
n;t has the predicted negative sign and is strongly
signi￿cant.
In conclusion, undervaluation positively a⁄ects the growth of exports, raising both their
total value and extensive margin. Yet, the e⁄ect is not homogeneous across goods. In particular,
undervaluation seems to have boosted exports mainly of the country￿ s principal manufactures
(manufactured goods whose weight in world exports is large).
5 The lira/euro and Italy￿ s economic growth
Figure 1 (shown above in Section 1) plots two measures of Italy￿ s undervaluation over the entire
period 1861-2011. In this section, we describe in detail how these measures were computed and
draw out their implications.








































































real exchange rate bilateral undervaluation (vs. the US)
equally-weighted average undervaluation trade-weighted average undervaluation
Source: authors￿ calculations. (1) Data in logs. A positive (negative) value corresponds to undervaluation
(overvaluation). The two shaded areas correspond to the periods 1914-1920 and 1939-1950.
5.1 Real exchange rate and misalignments of the lira/euro
We start by computing Italy￿ s (bilateral) real exchange rate (RER), which we derive from the
PWT from 1950 through 2009. The log of Italy￿ s RER (the black thick dashed line in Figure
4) is de￿ned as ln(xrat=ppp), where xrat is the nominal exchange rate of the lira/euro vis-￿-vis
the US dollar and ppp is the PPP exchange rate. The periods before 1950 and after 2009 are not
covered by the PWT; for these, we use data on the nominal exchange rate vis-￿-vis US dollar
together with consumer price indices (CPIs) for the United States and Italy.51
One may worry that the CPIs for the United States and Italy are based on di⁄erent bas-
kets.52 However, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the approximation is reasonable,
especially if the purpose is to use the resulting RER (or its "derivative product" undervaluation)
in a regression model. If we start from PPP in a given year (say 2009) and construct a series
that covers the period 1950-2009 by using CPIs, this new series has a correlation with the PWT
PPP series of 99.6% (98.3% when expressed in ￿rst di⁄erences).53
51For the year 2011, we have used Consensus Forecasts for in￿ ation rates in the U.S. and Italy. Similarly, as
a forecast for the nominal exchange rate of the lira/euro vis-￿-vis the US dollar in 2011, we have followed the
standard method of using the latest available market price.
52In practice, however, it is well known that di⁄erences in the basket of goods also a⁄ect PPP estimates,
because, for instance, not all goods (and, then, their prices) are available in all countries.
53Nevertheless, there are sometimes large di⁄erences in levels, especially in the years adjacent to those in which
35Bilateral undervaluation vis-￿-vis US dollar in 1950-2009 (the black thin line in Figure 4)
is calculated by correcting for the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect as in Section 2 (where equation (1) is
estimated using annual data). Visual comparison of the RER and this measure of undervaluation
shows that the correction changes the level of the latter with respect to the former, but that
its time pro￿le is basically the same.54 The similarity in the behavior over time of the RER
and undervaluation is maintained despite the fact that Italy￿ s real GDP per capita (the control
variable used to estimate undervaluation from RER) rises by 500% between 1950 and 2009.
To extend our measure of undervaluation to the periods before 1950 and after 2009, we
regress this variable on the RER based on CPIs and extrapolate from the regression results.
Other estimates could also be obtained using only changes across time in the RER based on
CPIs, or by using other variables (either in a regression model or focusing only on the changes),
such as the measure of RER based on WPIs, or the measures of undervaluation uCPI
n;t and uWPI
n;t
(see Section 2). These alternative approaches in fact provide very similar results.55
The trade-weighted index of undervaluation is calculated in a similar fashion. We ￿rst
computed RERs vis-￿-vis the US dollar from the PWT for all Italy￿ s main trading partners
in the period 1950-2009, which we extended backward and forward using data on CPIs and
exchange rates. The main trading partners are de￿ned as the 61 countries included in the
Bank of Italy￿ s competitiveness indicators (see Finicelli, Liccardi and Sbracia, 2005) for the
period 1950-2011; for earlier years these are the 10 main trading partners included in the data
set constructed by the Bank of Italy and Federico, Tattara and Vasta (2011). RERs are then
transformed into bilateral measures of undervaluation vis-￿-vis the US dollar by correcting for
the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect. The di⁄erence between Italy￿ s and a trading partner￿ s measures
of undervaluation provides a bilateral measure of undervaluation of the lira/euro vis-￿-vis the
latter country￿ s currency. Finally, we use export and import data for Italy in the period 1861-
2009 (see Section 4) to construct the trade weights. By taking the weighted average, we obtain
the trade-weighted index (the red thick line in Figure 4).56
5.1.1 Some caveats
As emphasized above, errors a⁄ecting the level of the RER (such as those due to di⁄erences
across countries in the basket of goods from which the CPIs are computed) will translate into
mismeasurement of the extent of undervaluation. In addition to this, there are other potential
price level data are available to the International Comparison Program (a point on which we return below). And,
of course, because CPIs are indices and not price levels, when we extend the RER back in time, any error in its
level at one point in time is transmitted to all previous data.
54The correlation between the two series is 0.95 in 1950-2009.
55The advantage of the regression approach is that it allows us to compute con￿dence intervals. For the period
1950-2009, the con￿dence interval for the measure of undervaluation plotted in Figure 1 is obtained from the
estimates of the panel regression (2). For the remaining period, the con￿dence interval takes into account the
additional variability due to the regression of undervaluation on RER (which is performed only for Italy). In
addition, the preference for using the RER based on CPIs with respect to other variables is grounded in the fact
that this measure has the largest correlation with undervaluation in the period 1950-2009.
56For the sake of comparison, we also considered a measure of undervaluation computed as an equally-weighted
average, instead of a trade-weighted average, calculated on Italy￿ s 10 main trading partner countries (except
Russia) considered by Federico, Tattara and Vasta, 2011 (the blue thin dotted line in Figure 4).
36sources of mismeasurement.
The ￿rst one concerns the use of data spanning the two world wars. Because CPIs are
index numbers, in order to extend the RER (and the measure of undervaluation) we need a
complete series without breaks for all years in the 1861-1949 interval before PWT data are
available. Speci￿cally, we need price series that span the war years.
Unfortunately, the alternative series for this period are very di⁄erent. Our source for
Italy￿ s CPI is Mitchell (2008).57 An available alternative is that in Global Financial Data. The
two series are similar, with a correlation of 99.99% in levels, and 98.7% in ￿rst di⁄erences. There
is, however, one important discrepancy. In￿ ation in 1944 was 340% according to Mitchell and
490% according to Global Financial Data.58 This makes a big di⁄erence: on average, in the
whole pre-World War II period, the series from Global Financial Data signals an in￿ ation rate
for Italy which is 2 percentage points higher that the one based on Mitchell￿ s data (11.6% against
9.6%); excluding only the in￿ ation rate in 1944, that di⁄erence would be just 0.3 percentage
points (6.1% against 5.8%).
These di⁄erences can have non-negligible e⁄ects on the level of our measures of underval-
uation. To show this, we have constructed an alternative bilateral measure of undervaluation,
under the assumption that in￿ ation in 1944 was 490% instead of 340%. According to the latter,
during the period 1861-1939 undervaluation was almost 40%, against just 10% if in￿ ation in
1944 was 340%. And this di⁄erence occurs with a correlation of 1 between the two series in
1861-1939.
Potential problems a⁄ecting the level of undervaluation, like those just described, do not
prevent the use of this variable in panel growth regressions like those of Section 2 or Section
4. In fact, those regressions exploit the time-series variability of undervaluation and potential
mismeasured levels are accounted for by including country ￿xed e⁄ects.59 On the other hand,
conclusions based on the level of this variable must be drawn cautiously, because errors in levels
may not be negligible.
Another issue concerns the interpretation of the bilateral measure of undervaluation (and,
in turn, of the trade-weighted index). The variable is a residual which averages zero by con-
struction. Precisely, the cross-country average is zero in each sample year since the regression
includes time dummies. The level correctly measures undervaluation to the extent that the
average undervaluation across countries is zero ￿ not an unreasonable hypothesis given our
large sample. However, the precise interpretation of our measure is the undervaluation of Italy￿ s
currency vis-￿-vis the US dollar, with respect to the average undervaluation across countries. To
put it di⁄erently, undervaluation in each country is a relative measure. Because undervaluations
are calculated against the same cross-country average, bilateral comparisons of undervaluations
(which we use in the empirical analysis of Section 4 as well as to construct the trade-weighted
57From 1968 to 2010, however, we have updated Mitchell￿ s series with the "o¢ cial" CPI from Italy￿ s ISTAT.
58Interestingly, in￿ ation rates in 1943 and 1945 are quite similar across the two sources, equal to 67.9% and
97.0% according to Mitchell and 67.3% and 96.2% according to Global Financial Data. In￿ ation rates are also
similar in all the other war years (and identical in most non-war years).
59Note that in the empirical models of Section 2 and Section 4, we exclude data that span through the war
years. In addition, we include three sets of country ￿xed e⁄ects, one for each macro-period (the pre-World War I,
the interwar, and the post-World War II period), to account, among the other things, for the di⁄erent base years
of our indices.
37index) correctly measure the di⁄erential degree of undervaluation in two di⁄erent countries.
5.2 Misalignments of the lira/euro
Figure 4 suggests that the lira was undervalued for about 100 of 120 years from 1861 through
the early 1980s. In the remaining 30 years, from the early 1980s through 2011, Italy￿ s currency
has been persistently overvalued.
How can a currency remain undervalued or overvalued for so long? In a world where wages
and prices adjust less than instantaneously, a signi￿cant change in the nominal exchange rate
can have persistent e⁄ects. Thus, the Italian government￿ s decision to signi￿cantly devalue the
lira following World War II, before stabilizing it against the US dollar after 1949, could give rise
to a period of undervaluation because it took time for wages and prices to adjust upward.
But it is implausible that this mechanism alone could produce the kind of very persistent
undervaluation and overvaluation that we observe in the data. Given the passage of "some"
years, wages and prices should adjust. If the authorities attempt to resort to serial devaluations,
wages and prices will adjust even faster.
Thus, the very persistent deviation of the exchange-rate-adjusted price level from the
international norm must re￿ ect in addition, or instead, other factors. For Italy, we emphasize
two. First, abundant supplies of labor to the manufacturing sector ￿ owing from the rural
(especially Southern) periphery to the country￿ s industrial core, which pushed the price level
down relative to the international average for much of the 1950s and 1960s. Second, the stance
of ￿scal policy. This was relatively restrictive from the mid-1890s to 1913 and from 1945 to the
late 1960s, restraining the growth of domestic demand and limiting the rise in the price level
relative to the international norm. It was more expansionary during the two world wars, the
1930s, and especially after 1970, pushing up the price level and making for overvaluation rather
than undervaluation, other things equal.60
In the following, we ￿rst describe the misalignments of the lira/euro since 1861, as reported
in Figure 1, brie￿ y recalling how the exchange rate was set across the di⁄erent regimes. Then,
we analyze empirically the factors that allowed the currency to remain undervalued, overvalued
or stable, and draw the implications of the misalignments for Italy￿ s economic growth.
60Note that adherence to a metallic standard before World War II prevented countries from setting a parity
with respect to another country￿ s currency and to undervalue the exchange rate. In the textbook story of the
gold standard, then, undervaluation and balance-of-payments surpluses (or their reciprocal) are only transitory
phenomena, as the mechanism described by Hume￿ s price-specie ￿ ow model restores equilibrium in the balance
of payments as well as in the real exchange rate. The modern literature, however, has started to reject this myth,
describing a reality that was much di⁄erent from the textbook story (see Eichengreen and Flandreau, 1997).
The discipline imposed by the "rules of the game" allowed only a small group of core countries to commit to
gold convertibility. Many peripheral countries frequently decided to suspend gold convertibility and imposed ￿at
money as a legal tender. For instance, in the period preceding World War I, Italy adhered to a metallic standard
for just 15 out of more than 50 years. In this case, ￿ uctuations of the currency well outside the range of the gold
points were possible, allowing for more persistent misalignments. In addition, misalignments could also follow
from sticky wages and other frictions in the labor or product markets, just like after the end of metallic standards.
385.2.1 An overview of the misalignments
In 1859, on the eve of political uni￿cation, the Italian peninsula was divided into seven legally
autonomous political units and six monetary zones.61 Silver monometallic and non-decimal
systems were predominant.62 The August 1862 monetary reform (the so-called Pepoli Law,
after Gioachino Pepoli, the Minister of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce who proposed it)
implemented, instead, a bimetallic and decimal system. This was simply the extension to the
whole peninsula of the monetary system of Piedmont, which, in turn, derived directly from the
French system.
The Italian authorities deemed that the gold standard was the best available system.63
They forecast that it would eventually be chosen by Italy￿ s neighbors. But the authorities
also acknowledged that national decisions about monetary arrangements were not independent
of each other. In modern terminology, they recognized that network externalities characterize
international monetary arrangements.64 The government￿ s view was that these externalities
￿ owed from Italy￿ s strong economic and political ties with France, strong trade relationships
with Germany and other countries in which silver was legal tender, and the fact that debt
obligations were sold in markets in which silver circulation was widespread.65 In other words, the
choice of exchange rate regime was driven by factors unrelated to the quest for competitiveness;
bimetallism was adopted to maintain the same monetary arrangement as in other important
partner countries.66 As it happened, at the time of uni￿cation the lira was undervalued (Figure
1).
In its ￿rst 30 years, to the early 1890s, the currency remained undervalued. In 1866,
with the birth of the Latin Monetary Union and approach of the third war of independence,
Italy suspended the convertibility of the lira (corso forzoso), and the currency depreciated in
response, achieving a very high undervaluation (over 50% in trade-weighted terms). Following
the upswing in economic activity in Europe in the early 1880s, which was shared by the Italian
61In the Duchy of Modena and Reggio, which did not have an autonomous monetary system, trades occurred
using mainly the Piedmontese and Austrian coins. A very detailed description of the situation at the time of the
monetary uni￿cation is in De Mattia (1959). For a comprehensive monetary history of Italy, see Fratianni and
Spinelli (2001). More focused accounts about the history of the Italian lira are Cipolla (2001) and Martinez Oliva
and Schiltzer (2005).
62An example of non-decimal system was in place in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, were one piastra was
worth 120 grana or 240 tornesi (although the unit account was the ducato, which was worth 100 grana). In many
parts of Italy decimal systems were either unknown or regarded as "annoying" (De Mattia, 1959).
63Pepoli himself regarded it as the "most logical and perfect." See Martinez Oliva and Schiltzer (2005).
64See Eichengreen (2008b) for a recent perspective on this issue.
65Pepoli￿ s law proposal reported that: "Le frequenti e importanti relazioni commerciali che noi abbiamo con la
Francia, con la Germania e con le altre nazioni che tengono l￿ argento per moneta legale, le condizioni speciali del
credito italiano, per cui i titoli del nostro debito pubblico sono negoziati sui principali mercati ove si usa l￿ argento
[...] renderebbero per ora inopportuna e nociva una riforma [the gold standard, editors￿note] che operata, invece,
d￿ accordo con le principali nazioni d￿ Europa riuscirebbe perfetta" (Corbino, 1931, cited from Fratianni and Spinelli,
2001, p. 139).
66Limits placed to the convertibility of silver, to prevent the e⁄ects of Gresham￿ s law, were such that the system
was very close to a monometallic gold standard (a "masked gold standard," as Fratianni and Spinelli, 2001, de￿ne
it).
39economy, the gold standard was reintroduced in 1883. This allowed the lira to remain stable in
nominal terms and the preceding undervaluation to be gradually reversed.
The 1893 ￿nancial crisis then led to a new suspension of convertibility in 1894.67 In
1896, the defeat of the Italian Army in Ethiopia put an end to the semi-authoritarian regime
of Francesco Crispi (Toniolo, 1988). By the mid-1890s, with the banking crisis ￿nally over,
the government turned to monetary discipline and ￿scal consolidation (Cesarano, Cifarelli and
Toniolo, 2009). These policies, pursued under both the ￿ oating exchange rate of 1894-1902 and
the gold-shadowing policy of 1903-1911, resulted in a currency broadly at equilibrium levels.
When World War I broke out, the government put in place a system of consumption
rationing and price controls in an (imperfectly successful) e⁄ort to contain in￿ ation. After a
period of overvaluation in 1916-1918, sharp nominal depreciation of the lira (nearly 70% vis-￿-vis
the US dollar between 1918 and 1921) more than o⁄set higher consumer prices. The country
therefore exited the war with an undervalued currency.
Between 1921 and the mid-1930s, the lira appreciated in both nominal and real terms. A
substantial portion of the initial undervaluation was eliminated in 1927 when Benito Mussolini￿ s
government appreciated the currency in advance of restoring the gold exchange standard. The
lira peg of 19 to the dollar and over 90 to the pound sterling, the so-called quota novanta, was
the cornerstone of Mussolini￿ s economic policy. The literature has not reached a unanimous
verdict on this policy, which was driven by political motivations connected to the prestige of the
fascist regime (see Cohen, 1972, Ciocca, 1976, and De Cecco, 1993).68
The lira then remained anchored to gold during the Great Depression, including in the
"autarkic policy" period when trade embargoes were imposed against the country as a result
of its invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Italy was among the last countries to devalue, in October
1936, fostering recovery in 1937-1939.69
Following World War II, the quest for competitiveness grew stronger. In 1943 the military
authorities in the South of Italy established a conversion rate for Allied Military Notes (so-called
amlire) of 100 to the dollar, a depreciation that more than compensated for the in￿ ation recorded
in 1938-1943.70 In January 1946, Alcide De Gasperi￿ s Government gave exporters the prize of
an additional 125 lire per US dollar, setting the dollar exchange rate at 225. Luigi Einaudi, the
67As Cesarano, Cifarelli and Toniolo (2009) remind us, it is not entirely clear when the gold standard was
legally suspended. The Bank Act of 1893, which instituted the Bank of Italy, was unclear about the obligations
concerning the conversion of notes into gold (indicating that conversion rules would be issued at a later date) ￿
an ambiguity that was probably intentional.
68As De Cecco (1993) famously put it, "it is really di¢ cult to express opinions about this choice, but also to
establish post-hoc its insanity."
69The role of the gold standard in setting the stage for the Great Depression, favoring the transmission across
countries while amplifying the magnitude of the crisis, and ￿nally hampering the recovery for as long as it remained
in place has been extensively analyzed by Eichengreen (1995).
70This was also a way for the Allies to increase their purchasing power in the country (Graziani, 1979). The
nominal exchange rate underlying Figure 1 is equal to about 20 units per U.S. dollar in 1943, as from Bordo,
Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001), which is the rate prevailing in the north of Italy (similarly,
Fratianni and Spinelli, 2001, report a rate of 19 units per U.S. dollar). Note that Fratianni and Spinelli (2001)
report a PPP rate of 39.31 that year. Hence, an exchange rate of 100 units per U.S. dollar, like the one established
in the south of Italy, would have implied an undervalued currency. On the other hand, an exchange rate of 20
units per dollar would have resulted into an overvalued currency, as in Figure 1.
40Governor of the Bank of Italy, deemed this measure insu¢ cient to restore price competitiveness
(see Carli, 1996). In March 1946, under pressure from textile producers, exporters were allowed
to retain half of the dollars obtained from their sales abroad, which they could convert into lire
in the free and black markets, giving rise to a multiple exchange rate system.71
Italy maintained this multiple exchange rate system even after joining the International
Monetary Fund in 1947. In 1948, indicative of the success in the monetary stabilization, the
exchange rate quoted on the free market was broadly equal to the o¢ cial rate, roughly 575 lire.
In 1949 the exchange rate was de￿nitively set to 625 lire per US dollar ￿ a further depreciation
with respect to the previous year.72 It was maintained at this level for more than 20 years.
When Italian authorities set the exchange rate vis-￿-vis the dollar in 1949, they carefully
considered the external competitiveness of domestic goods and services. Whereas the Annual
Report of the Bank of Italy had not even mentioned the exchange rate in the entire period
1941-1945, starting in 1946 considerations of competitiveness (and about the implications of
changes in the exchange rate for domestic prices) became again central to the analysis of the
Bank￿ s sta⁄. Thus, in its Annual Report for the year 1948, the Bank of Italy wrote (see Bank
of Italy, 1949):
"Supponendo, come sembra lecito fare, che nel 1913 il tasso di cambio della lira col
dollaro corrispondesse alla parit￿ economica, e che nel 1938 tale parit￿ fosse variata
in relazione all￿ aumento relativo dei prezzi in Italia, essa si stabilirebbe in tale anno a
22.6; equivalenza che, moltiplicata per l￿ aumento relativo dei prezzi ingrosso italiani
su quelli americani tra il 1938 ed il dicembre 1947, fornirebbe per quest￿ ultima data
una parit￿ col dollaro di 596."
Because the lira was still quoted at 575 to the dollar in December 1948, the identi￿cation
of an "equilibrium" rate of 596 was a call for a further nominal devaluation that, in fact, occurred
the following year. Figure 1 shows that the currency was largely undervalued in 1950 and that
undervaluation remained above 20% in trade-weighted terms until the early 1960s.
The 1970s saw the collapse of the Bretton Woods System and the attempt, in Europe,
to recreate the system on a regional basis with the Snake. All the while, the lira depreciated
serially. While the economic and ￿nancial crisis of the mid-1970s hit the country hard ￿ in 1976
it forced the closure of the foreign exchange market for several weeks ￿ the currency remained
undervalued for much of the decade.
European countries worried that exchange rate volatility would undermine the process of
regional integration, weaken the expansion of trade and fuel in￿ ation. The European Monetary
System (EMS) was an attempt to respond to the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System by
reinstituting pegged but adjustable exchange rates. Realignments occurred periodically from the
outset of the EMS in 1979 through 1987. There were no further realignments in the following
￿ve years, only Italy￿ s move from the broad to the narrow band. But relatively high in￿ ation
made for overvaluation, setting the stage for the EMS crisis that erupted in September 1992,
when the lira, along with other weaker European currencies, was forced to depreciate. Italian
71In the free market, the lira was traded at further depreciated levels.
72Even though of a smaller extent with respect to those established by other European countries.
41authorities responded to the crisis by turning to ￿scal consolidation and adopting an explicit
in￿ ation target. These measures succeeded in containing the budget de￿cit and consumer prices
and permitted the country to reenter the EMS in 1996. In 1999, the currencies of 11 countries,
including Italy, were then irrevocably locked, and the euro was introduced. That year Italy￿ s
currency was at its equilibrium level in trade-weighted terms. In the following ten year, turned
into an overvaluation, that persists today.73
5.2.2 Main determinants of the misalignments
In this section, we perform a time series analysis for the Italian economy to examine empirically
the factors that have a⁄ected the misalignments of the lira/euro since 1861. For this purpose,
we construct a data set with variables commonly used in the literature on the real exchange rate
(such as Edwards, 1989, and Eichengreen, 2008b).
Our dependent variable is the trade-weighted index of undervaluation of Italy￿ s currency,
as constructed above. Among its determinants, the most important variables on which we focus
are the supply of labor to the manufacturing sector and the stance of ￿scal policy. The former
factor is measured by the relative number of workers, calculated in full time equivalent, in the
agricultural sector with respect to the manufacturing sector. We take this variable as a proxy for
the relative size of the traditional versus the modern sector, as described by Lewis (1954). For
the latter factor, we use data about changes in the stock of public debt (as recently reconstructed
by Francese and Pace, 2008), scaled by the GDP, as a proxy for the ￿scal de￿cit over GDP. The
theory suggests that an increase in the relative size of the traditional sector or a decline in the
￿scal de￿cit raise undervaluation.
Note that, in the previous sections, we have hypothesized that undervaluation spurs growth
by reducing the relative size of the traditional sector, while here we are speculating that, in
turn, the relative size of the traditional sector a⁄ects undervaluation. This creates a potential
endogeneity problem that, in a robustness check, we address by instrumenting our proxy.
To control for the stance of monetary policy, we consider a measure of Italy￿ s real interest
rates, built as the di⁄erence between long-term interest rates (from Fratianni and Spinelli, 2001)
and the consumer price in￿ ation rate. An increase in real interest rates reduces aggregate
demand, tends to lower domestic prices and, in turn, raises undervaluation.
Other common factors used in empirical studies of the real exchange rate are measures of
capital liberalization and trade openness. For Italy, we take the ￿rst of these variable from the
work of Quinn (2003) and its most recent update in Quinn and Voth (2008). Trade openness is
de￿ned as the ratio between Italy￿ s gross trade (i.e. the value of imports plus exports) and GDP.
A rise in capital in￿ ows following a capital account liberalization exerts upward pressures on the
domestic currency and, therefore, tends to reduce undervaluation. At the same time, a trade
liberalization, by making available cheaper foreign goods and reallocating domestic resources
73The extent of the bilateral overvaluation vis-￿-vis the US dollar is much larger (in the order of 40%) mainly
because from the 1990s the number of countries covered by the Penn World Table increases sharply, including
many developing economies with an undervalued currency. Because bilateral undervaluation is a relative measure,
calculated with respect to the cross-country average, adding a large number of countries with undervalued cur-
rencies pushes down the resulting bilateral index for Italy, without a⁄ecting much, however, the trade-weighted
index.
42towards more productive sectors, lowers domestic prices and enhances undervaluation.
Last, we consider an index of labor productivity in the industrial sector. A rise in pro-
ductivity in the industrial sector boosts a country￿ s competitiveness by lowering domestic prices
of tradeable goods; to this extent, it tends to raise undervaluation. At the same time, however,
a fast-growing country that records sharp rises in productivity attracts foreign capitals which
may generate an appreciation of the currency, thereby reducing undervaluation.
Because our dependent variable is stationary, while most of the independent variables are
not, we estimate the model in ￿rst di⁄erences. Our benchmark speci￿cation, then, is:





+ b2 ￿ ￿de￿citt + b3 ￿ ￿iR
t + b4 ￿ ￿Kt
+b5 ￿ ￿Ot + b6 ￿ gLPt + "t , (35)
where ut is the value of the trade-weighted index of undervaluation of the lira/euro at year t; ￿ is
the ￿rst-di⁄erences operator; At=Mt is the relative size of the workforce in agriculture versus the
manufacturing sector; de￿citt is the ￿scal de￿cit, which is approximated by Dt=Yt ￿Dt￿1=Yt￿1,
with Dt=Yt being the ratio of public debt over GDP; iR
t is the real interest rate, computed as
iN
t ￿ ￿i, with iN
t being the long-term interest rate and ￿i the rate of in￿ ation; Kt is the index
of capital account liberalization; Ot is the measure of trade openness, gLPt is the growth rate of
labor productivity in the industrial sector; bi 2 R (i =;0;1;:::;6) and "t is the error term. The
model is estimated with robust OLS and returns uncorrelated residuals.
Table 10 reports the estimates of equation (35) for di⁄erent time periods. The ￿rst column
shows the results for the whole sample (from 1861 to 2009). Supply of labor to the manufacturing
sector and debt over GDP are signi￿cant and have the predicted sign, along with the real interest
rate, capital account liberalization and trade openness. Labor productivity has a negative sign
(i.e. a rise reduces undervaluation), and it is also signi￿cant. The second column reports the
estimates of equation (35) for the period preceding World War II (1861-1939). Results are
generally con￿rmed, despite the decline in the number of observations. The third column shows
the results, for the period following World War II, of a regression that excludes trade openness
in order to prevent a stronger decline in the number of observations (as we do not have trade
data from 1950 to 1961). Again due presumably to the decline in the number of observations,
only the real interest rate and labor productivity preserve statistical signi￿cance, even though
all the variables have the predicted sign. In particular, both our main independent variables,
relative size of the traditional sector and ￿scal de￿cit over GDP, lose statistical signi￿cance. For
the ￿rst of these variables, this result could be explained by the fact that Italy had an advanced
industrial sector for most of that subsample. The lack of statistical signi￿cance of the ￿scal
variable is more surprising. Then, in an attempt to augment the number of observations, we
also consider a subsample including also the interwar period (fourth column of Table 10). The
statistical signi￿cance of the ￿scal de￿cit over GDP returns, suggesting that the smaller sample
size may have played a key role in the previous result, while the insigni￿cance of supply of labor
to the manufacturing sector remains. This is an indication that, for most of this subsample,
labor supply was no longer "unlimited." In the next section, we suggest that it is in the 1960s
that the achievement of full employment and the related waves of wage claims triggered this
regime switch.
To check the robustness of our results, we performed a number of sensitivity tests. As
43Table 10: Determinants of undervaluation (1)
(1) Estimates of equation (35). Robust t statistics in brackets; * signi￿cant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.
alternative proxies for the relative size of the traditional versus the modern sector, we have
constructed di⁄erent indexes. First, to the numerator, we have added workers in the mining,
construction and retail trade sectors to agricultural workers. Second, we have counted workers
using heads instead of the full-time equivalent measure. All these variables have a very high
correlation with our benchmark proxy, equal at least to 98%. Not surprisingly, they provide the
same results.
As for ￿scal policy, we have built a series for the ￿scal de￿cit over GDP using data from
Repaci (1962) from 1861 to 1960, and the Italian Ministry of Treasury series thereafter. Because
the ￿rst source contains data for ￿scal years, we have used the same heuristic as Fratianni and
Spinelli (2001) to transform them into calendar year data.74 Including this variable into the
benchmark speci￿cation in the place of public debt over GDP, and using its deviations from the
trend (obtained by applying a Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter), returns a signi￿cant coe¢ cient with the
predicted negative sign, while all the other independent variables preserve the correct sign and
signi￿cance. In particular, the proxy for relative size of the traditional sector becomes signi￿cant
at the 1% threshold.
We also tried some other regressors often considered by the literature, such as terms of
trade (available from the OECD for the years 1955-2009 and, for the period 1862-1949, from
our own calculation using data from Bank of Italy and Federico, Tattara and Vasta, 2011), the
value of remittances over GDP, and the ratio between the male and female population (Du and
Wei, 2011, discuss the role of the "sex ratio" for the real exchange rate). When included in
74Speci￿cally, half of the ￿scal-year de￿cit at time t, which ended on June 30 for most of the sample years, is
attributed to the calendar year t ￿ 1 and the remaining half to the calendar year t.












Source: Maddison (2008), Johnston and Williamson (2003). (1) Annualized rate of growth in the period indicated
on the horizontal axis. (2) Eu-12* is Maddison￿ s "EU-12" excluding Italy; for the period 1861-1870 it also excludes
Austria.
the benchmark regression, only the ￿rst of these factors is statistically signi￿cant (at the 10%
threshold) and has the predicted negative sign (while the other variables maintain the predicted
sign as well as statistical signi￿cance).
Last, we address the endogeneity problem a⁄ecting relative size of the traditional sector
(which, in turn, is in￿ uenced by undervaluation) by instrumenting it with the lagged values
of the ￿rst di⁄erences. The results con￿rm the sign and signi￿cance (at the 10% threshold)
of the coe¢ cient of the relative size of the traditional sector, and point to a somewhat higher
magnitude and signi￿cance of this variable for the period preceding World War II.
These results are at least suggestive that an abundant supply of labor to the manufacturing
sector (at least until the 1960s) and the stance of ￿scal policy have been key determinants of
the persistence of the misalignments of the lira/euro since Italy￿ s uni￿cation.
5.2.3 Implications for Italy￿ s growth
What are the implications of the misalignments of the lira/euro for Italy￿ s growth? Figure 5
shows a standard periodization of real GDP growth. It distinguishes the "miracle" years, from
1950 to 1973; the phases of sustained growth during the et￿ giolittiana (from the mid-1890s to
the eve of World War I) as well as in 1974-1989;75 and three phases of disappointing growth:
1861-1895, the interwar years, and the two most recent decades.
75The split of the ￿rst globalization era in two di⁄erent periods, separated by the mid-1890s, is quite common
in the periodizations of Italy￿ s growth, following Gerschenkron (1955). For a di⁄erent perspective, see Fenoaltea
(2003).
45The highest growth period. Figure 1 suggests that Italy bene￿ted from an undervalued
currency during the miracle years 1950-1973. That Italy￿ s currency was undervalued in the
early 1950s seems to be generally accepted (see Lamfalussy, 1963; Ciocca, Filosa and Rey, 1973;
Graziani, 1979; Boltho, 1996).76 Boltho (1996), for instance, reports an undervaluation of 17%
in 1950, not far from our 27% (for the trade-weighted index). He ￿nds that Italy￿ s real exchange
rate depreciated further in the early 1950s and remained undervalued for the rest of the decade;
Figure 1 con￿rms his ￿ndings.
According to the estimates in Section 2, an average undervaluation on the order of 30% in
1950s and 1960s contributed 0.6% to 1.2% per year to GDP growth (the corresponding elasticities
range from 2% to 4%). This is a very strong contribution for the entirety of a 20-year-long period.
As a con￿rmation that causality may have gone from undervaluation to GDP growth, note that
export growth soared in this period (see Figure 6).77
How could the currency remain undervalued for such a long period? Boltho (1996) points
to a low rate of in￿ ation due to wage moderation and rapid productivity growth. The fact that
in the 1950s wage in￿ ation was subdued is undisputed (see, e.g., Ciocca, Filosa and Rey, 1973,
and the references cited therein). Figure 7 con￿rms that in the industrial sector, during that
decade, nominal wages grew at a lower rate than labor productivity, while the nominal value of
the lira remained stable.78
An excess supply of labor to the tradeable sector was probably key in explaining wage
moderation relative to labor productivity growth in the 1950s. Several factors may have con-
tributed to restrain wages. First, internal migration from the south to the north and from the
countryside to the cities reached unprecedented levels. In each year between 1951 and 1965,
about 1.5 million of people transferred their home within the country; the "industrial triangle"
alone (Genoa, Milan and Turin), absorbed over 100,000 people per year (Golini, 1978). Second,
unemployment was high: in the early 1950s the o¢ cial rate was about 10%, with about two
millions of unemployed; moreover, according to some estimates, the underemployed were an
additional 1 to 4 millions (Ciocca, Filosa and Rey, 1973). Third, among the employed in 1950,
for each person occupied in manufacturing there were two in the low-productivity agricultural
sector; within 20 years, this ratio was reversed. Fourth, trade unions, which had been disman-
tled during the fascist regime, reemerged divided and inexperienced in the late 1940s (Horowitz,
76On the other hand, many authors agreed that the U.S. dollar was generally overvalued after 1949. It is
interesting, in particular, to reappraise Samuelson (1964) to decipher the international developments occurred
during the 1950s (as well as to gain some insight about the current tensions between the U.S. and China). In the
￿nale of his paper, Samuelson concludes that: "(1) The dollar has been somewhat overvalued in this last decade
[...] economists everywhere would prefer, if they could rerun history, that the 1949 depreciations abroad had
been somewhat less sharp. (2) The overvaluation has hampered a high-employment policy at home [...]. (3) The
productivity improvements abroad since 1949 [...] have not yet been matched by commensurate rises in foreign
money wages relative to ours" (p. 153).
77The question of whether the high growth recorded during the 1950s and 1960s was "export led" is still
controversial. For a discussion, see, among the others, Lamfalussy (1963), Kindleberger (1967), Stern (1967),
Ciocca, Filosa and Rey (1973), Federico and Cohen (2001). Notice however that, when referring to "export-led
growth," the early literature refers to a virtuous cycle of exports, investments, productivity and exports, whose
theoretical foundations have been largely criticized (see, e.g., Gandolfo, 2001).
78Due to the di¢ culties in ￿nding reliable data on the stock of physical capital and its rental cost, Figure 7
focuses only on labor as the main production factor.
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Sources: Bank of Italy; Ercolani (1975). (1) Annual rates of growth (in percentage). (2) Wages and labor
productivity in the industrial sector. (3) A positive (negative) value corresponds to a nominal depreciation
(appreciation) vis-￿-vis the US dollar.
471966). Their wage claims were decentralized and, in many instances, ine⁄ectively advanced in
the 1950s.79 Last, Italian authorities maintained a neutral stance of ￿scal policy (with a de￿cit
to GDP ratio below 3%), while money growth was also contained (Fratianni and Spinelli, 2001).
These factors were gradually reversed during the 1960s. In 1962-63, the achievement of
full employment contributed to abate internal migrations. Most importantly, it led to a ￿rst
wage explosion in that biennium, with a second wave of wage claims at the end of the decade
(starting from 1969, with the so-called autunno caldo). Thus, wages began rising somewhat
more rapidly than labor productivity.
The "sustained growth" periods. During the two phases of sustained growth, the
currency was either broadly at equilibrium (1895-1913) or undervalued (in the 1970s and 1980s).
Very di⁄erent policies underlie these developments. In the earlier episode, the nominal exchange
rate was stable, as a result of the consistent policies adopted in Italy. A sound banking system
was restored by the mid-1890s, after the 1893 crisis. Between 1897 and 1913, the ratio of debt
to GDP fell from about 130% to less than 80% (Francese and Pace, 2008). Bonaldo Stringher,
appointed Director General of the Bank of Italy in 1900, carried out a successful monetary
stabilization (see Fratianni and Spinelli, 2001, and Cesarano, Cifarelli and Toniolo, 2009).
In the latter period, instead, the nominal exchange rate serially depreciated to compensate
for relatively high in￿ ation. The ￿scal de￿cit, that had averaged below 3% in the 1950s and
1960s, raised to about 5% in 1970-72 and to an astonishing 13% in 1973-1978. It averaged over
8% in the 1970s and 1980s. In only nine years, from 1970 to 1978, the ratio of public expenditure
to GDP almost doubled, from 28% to 52%. Monetary policy was strongly expansionary, not
last because of the monetization of the ￿scal de￿cit (Fratianni and Spinelli, 2001). The annual
rate of wage growth exceeded labor productivity growth in the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 7) and
was well above 10% for the ￿rst and unique time in the century and a half since uni￿cation.
The "disappointing growth" periods. In contrast, the lira was undervalued in 1861-
1895 and the interwar period, when growth rates were low. This is contrary to our hypothesis. In
the ￿rst 30 years following uni￿cation, the causes of this dismal performance are mostly domestic.
Economic, ￿nancial and political instability prevented the country from taking advantage of its
undervalued currency. In particular, despite undervaluation, Italy was a net importer during this
whole period. The newborn country was backward and poor and needed to import industrial raw
materials, arms, agricultural commodities, and manufactures. At the same time, the country
could not sell abroad many goods other than silk products and olive oil. It could not reach many
more markets than France.80 In the 1860s and 1870s, silkworm and grape phylloxera had more
visible impact on Italy￿ s exports than domestic economic policies. The wars plaguing Europe in
the XIX century, both military or only commercial, also had severe repercussions on the Italy￿ s
economy and its trade relationships (Stringher, 1911). The 1880s, which saw the exports of
79An example is o⁄ered, in the early 1950s, by the negotiations for the so-called conglobamento, which consisted
in the inclusion of many items composing the salary into a unique item. During these negotiations, CGIL, the
largest Italian trade union, claimed generalized wage rises in the order of 10%. The negotiation was concluded
in 1954 by Con￿ndustria, the federation of industrial employers, and CISL and UIL, the two other main trade
unions, who accepted for smaller pay rises (about 5% in the industrial sector), without the agreement of CGIL
(see Horowitz, 1966).
80In 1862-63, silk products and olive oil, alone, represented 50% of the value of Italy￿ s exports. France, still in
1870s, was the destination of half of Italy￿ s exports.
48the ￿rst manufactures, were dominated, on the one hand, by the uncertainties about the tari⁄
regime (Stringher, 1911); on the other hand, the excessively expansionary monetary and ￿scal
policies and the lack of government supervision of the banks of issue prepared the ground for
the banking crisis exploded in 1893 (Cesarano, Cifarelli and Toniolo, 2009).
From 1920 to 1939, instead, the causes of slow growth were mainly external. As Ciocca
(1976) puts it, the interwar period was not a good time to be a small open economy. In Western
Europe, the destination of 60% of Italy￿ s foreign sales, the volume of exports recovered to 1913
levels only in 1928; similarly, the ratio of exports to GDP recovered to its 1913 value only
in 1929.81 It followed the Great Depression, the protectionist revival and the trade sanctions
that led to the autarkic policy. The slow reabsorption of undervaluation until the mid-1930s
was mostly due to the rapid loss of workers￿bargaining power. The violence of the fascist
regime since the early 1920s, and then the dismantling of the pre-existing trade unions and the
introduction of a unique Fascist union hampered the normal functioning of the labor market,
transforming wages into a policy variable.
From the early 1990s, another period of slow growth in Italy compared to other advanced
economies, Italy￿ s currency was largely overvalued. Figure 7 shows that during the 1990s and
2000s wages kept growing more rapidly than labor productivity. It also shows that the dis-
appointing performance of labor productivity during the last 20 years is unprecedented in the
whole post World War II period. Also due to the 2008-09 crisis, labor productivity growth in
the 2000s has been virtually zero. The tendency to an overvaluation that had ￿rst appeared in
the early 1990s and had been absorbed with EMS crisis in 1992 returned in the 2000s, as the
nominal appreciation of the euro further deteriorated Italy￿ s price competitiveness. The esti-
mates performed in Section 2, however, suggest that the negative contribution of the exchange
rate to GDP growth during the last 20 years was quite low. In fact, when restricted to the set of
advanced countries, to which Italy belongs, the elasticity of growth to undervaluation is barely
positive (equal to 0.3%). Even the very large bilateral overvaluation of the lira/euro vis-￿-vis
the US dollar (about 40%) would translate into a very small contribution of overvaluation to
growth (in the order of -0.1% per year).
To conclude, Italy saw phases of rapid economic growth while the currency was either
undervalued or in equilibrium. On the other hand, undervaluation did not necessarily brought
about sustained GDP growth. Overall, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that an
undervalued currency is rather a facilitating condition, but not an engine, for economic growth
(Eichengreen, 2008a).
81In 1927, tari⁄ levels in many European countries were still higher than in 1913, including in Germany, Italy,




The source of the data used in Section 2 for the post World War II period is the Penn World
Table. For the period before World War II, the sample of countries include: Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States and Venezuela. Data sources are described below.
Nominal exchange rates vis-￿-vis the US dollar: Bank of Japan (1966), Bordo,
Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001), Carreras and Tafunell (2005), Carter, Gart-
ner, Haines, Olmstead, Sutch and Wright (2006), Ciocca and Ulizzi (1990), Flandreau and Zumer
(2004), OxLAD (2010).
Consumer and wholesale price indices: Ballesteros (1997), della Paolera and Ortiz
(1995), Mitchell (2008), Norges Bank (online data), Swiss Economic and Social History (online
data).
Real GDP per capita: Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001),
Carter, Gartner, Haines, Olmstead, Sutch and Wright (2006), Maddison (2010).
B Proofs for the model with constant returns to scale
B.1 Closed economy
To simplify he computations, we proceed in three stages.




































i (j)dj, 8m = T;N. From the
￿rst order conditions and the budget constraint, we get the demand for the non-tradeable and



















































































































































1￿￿, 8m = T;N.82
Stage 3. Given pN
i (j) = wi=zN
i (j), we now solve for the resource constraint, cN
i (j) =
qN



















































By aggregating across industries the quantities qm








































, 8m = T;N















i (j)dj, 8m = T;N. In other words, the
price index de￿ned in the ￿rst step is the same as the one de￿ned in the second step.
















































































































































With the assumption that e¢ ciencies are FrØchet distributed, equations (36)-(41) imme-
diately turn into the equations (4)-(9) reported in Section 3.1.1.
B.2 Open economy
We start by computing demand and supply for each non-tradeable and tradeable good. From























By imposing that prices are equal to marginal costs, we can solve for the resource constraint.
83We can sum the quantities of non-tradeable and tradeable goods as long as they show up symmetrically into
the utility function. In this case, the di⁄erent goods are formally equivalent to di⁄erent varieties of the same good.
The key to this computation is to de￿ne physical units in the same way as they enter the utility function, so that
we are summing up quantities measured in the same "e¢ ciency units" (for more on this point see Demidova and
Rodr￿guez-Clare, 2009).
521. For a non-tradeable good j we have:
cN
i (j) = qN































i that is: the productivity distributions for non-tradeable goods of the
open and the autarky economy are identical.
2. If the good j is sold only domestically (which happens if wi=zT















where, as mentioned, FT
i:o 6= FT
i that is: the productivity distributions for tradeable goods
of the open and the autarky economy are di⁄erent (in particular, we can show that FT
i:o < FT
i ;
in other words: FT
i:o ￿rst-order stochastically dominates FT
i ).
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n (j) = qT
























































































































n , if j is exported




i . However, while productivity for non-tradeable












, the expression of AT

































C Trade equilibrium with increasing returns to scale
We can rearrange the conditions under which good j is: exported (i.e. sold at home and abroad
using a pure pricing strategy), sold at home and abroad using a mixed pricing strategy, sold
53only domestically, or imported.









i (j) + dniqT
n (j)
dinqT















Aj [~ qT (j)]
(43)
Country i sells good j at home and abroad using a mixed strategy if and only if: (i)









ci (j) + cn (j)dni















Country i sells good j only at home if and only if: (i) inequality (42) holds; (ii) inequality
(43) does not hold; and (iii) inequality (44) does not hold. In this case, also ￿rms in country n
adopt a pure pricing strategy and sell their goods only in their domestic market.

















Let us consider the initial impact (before wages keep rising) of a depreciation. Suppose
that for the ￿rm of country i that produces good j, inequality (43) is ful￿lled, while the LHS of
(42) is equal to the RHS (i.e. (42) holds with an equality). Thus, this ￿rm does not export its
good because the constraint (42) is not ful￿lled. Now consider a rise of din to d0
in = ￿din and
a decline of dni to d0
ni = din=￿ (￿ > 1). It is straightforward to check that inequality (42) now
holds, while inequality (43) keeps holding. In other words, this ￿rm (and, possibly, others) can
now export its good to country n. For what concerns imports, one can verify, using the same
approach, that if inequality (45) held before the depreciation, it keeps holding also after the
depreciation; on the other hand, if the reciprocal (42) was such that, for a good j0 the LHS was
equal to the RHS, then this equation is now violated. In other words, the good j0 is no longer
imported.
We now turn to case in which wages rise from wi to w0
i = ￿wi (for simplicity, normalize
wn = 1). Again, it is easy to check that both inequalities (42) and (43) keep holding for the
"marginal good" j. Hence, despite the rise in wages (for an amount o⁄setting the depreciation),
the ￿rm of country i that produces good j keeps exporting in country n. Note also that, due to
the rise in the quantity produced and the presence of increasing returns to scale, the decline in
the average cost of this ￿rm is higher than ￿%, which is the extent of the depreciation. Therefore,
the rise in wages by ￿% is not enough to o⁄set the decline in average costs. By the same token,
the "marginal" good j0 that was imported before the depreciation and made domestically after
the depreciation, keeps being produced at home also after the rise in wages.
What happens in the labor market? The tradeable-goods sector is demanding more work-
ers, because of the newly exported goods and the goods that are produced at home and no longer
imported. The domestic price of tradeable goods, then, increases relative to the price of non-
tradeable goods, because both the newly produced goods and the goods that the country keeps








under the standard assumption that ￿ < 1, the non-tradeable-goods sector releases workers.
Notice that we cannot asses whether the rise in wi to w0
i = ￿wi is necessary or su¢ cient
to restore equilibrium. It could exceed or fall short of the necessary adjustment. Suppose, for
instance, that at w0
i = ￿wi there is an excess demand of workers in the tradeable sector. Then,
wages keep rising until equilibrium is restored. As wages rise, some exporters will be crowded out
as well as some ￿rms that produced only for the domestic market. In any case, the equilibrium
is no longer the same as the one before the depreciation. Some ￿rms that previously produced
or exported their goods can no longer do it, due to the higher wages. Some other domestic ￿rms
that have been able to enter the domestic or the foreign market remain in these markets. These
are the ￿rms that had the largest cost gains from increasing returns to scale.
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